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ABSTRACT
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are emerging technologies that have the ability to sense,
process, communicate, and transmit information to a destination, and they are expected to have sig-
nificant impact on the efficiency of many applications in various fields. The resource constraint
such as limited battery power, is the greatest challenge in WSNs design as it affects the lifetime
and performance of the network. An energy efficient, secure, and trustworthy system is vital when
a WSN involves highly sensitive information. Thus, it is critical to design mechanisms that are en-
ergy efficient and secure while at the same time maintaining the desired level of quality of service.
Inspired by these challenges, this dissertation is dedicated to exploiting optimization and game
theoretic approaches/solutions to handle several important issues in WSN communication, includ-
ing energy efficiency, latency, congestion, dynamic traffic load, and security. We present several
novel mechanisms to improve the security and energy efficiency of WSNs. Two new schemes are
proposed for the network layer stack to achieve the following: (a) to enhance energy efficiency
through optimized sleep intervals, that also considers the underlying dynamic traffic load and (b)
to develop the routing protocol in order to handle wasted energy, congestion, and clustering. We
also propose efficient routing and energy-efficient clustering algorithms based on optimization and
game theory. Furthermore, we propose a dynamic game theoretic framework (i.e., hyper defense)
to analyze the interactions between attacker and defender as a non-cooperative security game that
considers the resource limitation. All the proposed schemes are validated by extensive experi-
mental analyses, obtained by running simulations depicting various situations in WSNs in order
to represent real world scenarios as realistically as possible. The results show that the proposed
schemes achieve high performance in different terms, such as network lifetime, compared with the
state-of-the-art schemes.
Keywords– Wireless sensor networks, energy, efficient, security, game theory, routing,
clustering, attack, defense, duty cycle, network lifetime, optimization, quality of service.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we propose two novel and efficient mechanisms for the layer stack in
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). First, we propose EE-MAC, an Energy-Efficient MAC proto-
col for distributed WSNs. EE-MAC achieves a low-duty-cycle and hence low energy consumption
through optimized sleep intervals while transitioning data between sleep and active states. We
consider a weighted linear combination of delay and energy saving as the performance metrics.
Next, we introduce ADP, an ADaPtive energy efficient approach that meets the requirement of low
energy consumption and, at the same time, considers the underlying dynamic traffic load. ADP
enhances energy efficiency by dynamically adjusting sensor nodes sleep and wake-up cycles. ADP
utilizes a cost function intended to strike a balance between the conflicting goals of energy conser-
vation (i.e., waking up as rarely as possible), and minimizing sensed events reporting latency (i.e.,
waking up as frequently as possible). ADP also incorporates a feedback mechanism that constantly
monitors residual energy levels, the importance of the event to be reported, and predicts when the
next sensing event will occur.
The second contribution of this dissertation is its focus on developing the routing and clus-
tering algorithms for WSNs by proposing an efficient routing algorithm and developing an energy-
efficient clustering algorithm based on optimization and game theory. The proposed routing al-
gorithm utilizes an evolutionary game theoretical approach to show how sensor nodes in a WSN
could evolve their routing strategies to transmit data packets in an efficient and stable manner.
The proposed equilibrium solution aims to alleviate congestion and thereby improve the network
lifespan. In addition, we propose a Cost and Payment-based clustering Algorithm (CoPA) for
achieving energy efficiency in WSNs under a game theoretical framework. The analysis is based
on a non-cooperative, repeated general-sum game, where each node behaves selfishly in order to
maximize its lifespan (i.e., payoff). We demonstrate that the correlated equilibrium is a practical
solution for clusterhead selection, which provides better performance than the Nash Equilibria.
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Correlated equilibrium provides a balance between the fully cooperative solution and the fully
non-cooperative solution in terms of implementation overhead.
The final contribution of this dissertation is our proposal of a dynamic game theoretical
framework to analyze the interactions between the attacker and the defender as a non-cooperative
security game (i.e., hyper defense). The key idea is to model attackers/defenders to have multi-
ple levels of attack/defense strategies that vary in terms of effectiveness, strategy costs, and attack
gains/damages. Each player adjusts his strategy based on the strategy’s cost, potential attack gain/-
damage, and effectiveness in anticipating the opponent’s strategy. We study the achievable Nash
equilibrium for the attacker-defender security game where the players employ an efficient strat-
egy according to the obtained equilibrium. Furthermore, we present case studies of three different
types of WSNs attacks and explain how our hyper defense system can successfully model them.
Through extensive simulations, the performance of the proposed schemes is validated. We
observe reduced energy consumption at the cost of increased delay in EE-MAC. Simulation exper-
iments with different traffic loads have shown that ADP improves energy efficiency while keeping
latency low as well. The results also show that the proposed system of evolutionary routing game
is successful in converging strategy choices to evolution stable strategy (ESS) even under dynamic
network conditions. CoPA achieves better performance in terms of network lifetime and through-
put compared to other popular clustering techniques. In addition, simulation results show that the
proposed hyper defense approach achieves a higher level of performance compared to two other
fixed-strategy defense systems.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
A wireless network of sensor nodes is one of the most promising contemporary technolo-
gies that unifies the physical and virtual worlds. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a special
network comprised of some autonomous small devices, called sensor nodes, scattered over re-
gions of interest in order to monitor the physical conditions of the environments (e.g., temperature,
pressure, sound, etc.), and transmit the collected data to a central location.
Wireless sensor networks comprise one of the core next-generation application fields, in-
cluding, but not limited to civil engineering, environmental monitoring, medical monitoring, indus-
trial automation, home security, military systems, and transportation. A WSN typically consists
of a large number of sensor nodes that are capable of sensing and communicating wirelessly to
transmit collected sensory data to a destination for future processing. Figure 1.1 uses a simple
equation to presents the concept of WSNs [1].
Figure 1.1: Concept of wireless sensor networks based on the equation
The resources of sensor nodes in WSNs are limited in terms of energy, computational
capability, communication radius, and storage memory; the nodes operate on battery power and
are often deployed in rough environments. Due to the environmental constraints, it is usually cost-
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prohibitive or even impossible to replace depleted batteries, and the networks could also become
vulnerable to attacks that result in data exposure during transmission. Furthermore, the sensors
generally have weak defense capabilities against the network’s attacks/threats. Therefore, energy
efficiency and security are critical design goals to prolong the lifetime of a WSN. Consequently,
energy efficient and secure mechanisms are employed at various layers of the protocol stack to
ensure longevity and trustworthiness of the nodes and the network in general.
1.1 Problem Statement and Motivation
Sensor nodes in wireless networks are responsible for many tasks, such as, sensing events,
aggregating data, processing data, and sending and receiving data; some of these data are highly
sensitive. Furthermore, a large number of WSNs sensors have unique characteristics, including
autonomy, limited energy, constraint processing capability, and contested radio environment that
make sensing and communication difficult. These sensors are expected to run autonomously on
their battery power for a long period. On the one hand, ensuring security, availability, and con-
fidentiality of WSNs data has become critical. Design of sustainable WSNs becomes even more
challenging in resource-constrained environments; this implies that a node must effectively utilize
its resources, and increase its lifetime by closely monitoring its energy consumption and secu-
rity. On the other hand, WSNs are designed for specific applications ranging from small health
care systems to large-scale tactical military systems, and have to satisfy a set of specific require-
ments that varies from one application to another. In light of these networking constraints, energy
efficiency and security has attracted considerable attention from researchers during the past few
years [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. However, there is still more research required to develop energy efficient and
secure schemes of the existing algorithms in WSNs.
In a distributed sensor network, the design of the MAC protocol is particularly important
because it resolves channel contention among nodes and determines which node should access
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the shared channels and for how long. Quality of service provisioning poses additional chal-
lenges to the design of MAC protocols as guaranteeing delay requirements and sustaining band-
width constraints can be compromised due to increased mutual access interference [7]. MAC
protocols developed for WSNs can be broadly classified into two main categories: scheduling-
based and contention-based. Each protocol is designed for specific topologies or applications [8].
Scheduling-based approaches form schedules, which allow each node in the network to access
the channel and communicate with other nodes at predetermined time periods. Therefore, knowl-
edge of the network topology is required in these kinds of approaches. The schedule can be ar-
ranged according to specific approaches, such as collision avoidance or fairness among nodes. In
contention-based approaches, nodes compete for the wireless medium to acquire the access for
data transmission.
One of the well-known MAC protocols is S-MAC [9], where nodes periodically sleep and
wake-up in order to reduce energy consumption. As events being sensed could be sporadic, sensors
do not need to activate their sensing function at all times. Each node turns off its radio for a certain
time and then wakes up periodically to check for receptions. These listen and sleep states form a
frame. Though listening time is dictated by the limitations of MAC and PHY layers, there are no
such restrictions for the sleep time. Thus, the duty-cycle, defined as the ratio of listen interval to
frame duration, is small for large sleep time and vice-versa. With events sensed sporadically, it is
not necessary that sleep duration intervals remains fixed. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we argue
that sleep duration intervals should be optimized depending on the frequency of sensed activities.
The design of a WSN depends on the application for which it is being deployed. Among
all the aspects of an application, energy efficiency is one of the most critical concerns. Most of the
recent WSN studies have focused on how to maximize the lifetime of the system without sacrificing
other factors, such as latency and throughput.
In WSN applications, the underlying sensing traffic load can vary during different times
of the day, and each node may have different level of participating intensity in activities based
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on its location in the system, e.g., whether the node is close to the sink or not. Consequently,
different sensor nodes have different levels of energy consumption during sensing and communi-
cation activities. The level of energy consumption is one of the most important factors of sensor
networks because sensor nodes usually have very limited battery capacity. Dissipation of sensor
energy results in quickly diminishing the network lifetime and thus, significantly affects network
performance. Sensor sleeping is an effective technique to prolong a network’s lifetime by reducing
the energy wasted in idle listening. Scheduling a sensor’s sleep and wake-up cycles can be used in
any level of the protocol stack, such as the application layer, network layer, and data link layer. In
sleep mode, a node turns off the radio and goes to sleep in order to save energy instead of staying
idle.
Optimization method can be conducted either dynamically or statically. Both of the opti-
mization methods assist designers in meeting the application requirements: the static optimization
method remains fixed for the WSN’s lifetime and is appropriate for stable environmental events
while the dynamic method is appropriate for changing application requirements and real envi-
ronmental events. In addition, dynamic methods provide enhanced flexibility and accuracy [10].
Current approaches to sleep and wake-up scheduling are mostly static (i.e., a node always wakes up
after a fixed sleep time); this static approach is not efficient for most WSN applications because it
does not consider the dynamic occurrence behaviors of most underlying sensing events. Moreover,
a static approach does not consider this critical factor: the remaining energy resource of a sensor
node. It is intuitively clear that, when a sensor node has limited remaining battery life, it should
be more conservative in engaging its wake-up state to report sensing data in order to prolong its
lifetime. Therefore, a more energy-efficient sleep and wake-up scheduling scheme should be an
intelligent and dynamic approach.
Routing in a WSN is an especially challenging task as it involves energy consumption from
all the nodes that lie on a given route for a source-destination pair. Thus, designing routing proto-
cols for WSNs requires approaches that extend the network lifetime by utilizing the sensors’ lim-
4
ited battery as efficiently as possible [11]. Because of ever-increasing deployment of customized
WSN applications, research is still being conducted that tries to improve network capabilities and
to meet the quality-of-service demands for the application in question.
Because it has a significant impact on network performance and energy consumption, con-
gestion is one of the vital issues associated with WSNs [12]. While transmitting packets toward
their destinations, the nodes of a WSN have multiple paths from which to choose; each path poten-
tially can have a different associated cost as per the various routing metrics. Such variation in the
cost of energy associated with different routes means that some routes/paths may be more prefer-
able than others. Therefore, nodes are expected to have a clear preference among a set of available
paths. To avoid the overheads of retransmitting dropped packets due to collision, which can cause
an additional drain on battery life, every node has an incentive to choose the path with the lowest
cost while transmitting packets. When many nodes take this same routing strategy, this rational
behavior of sensor nodes will intuitively result in further congestion on the same path and leads
to energy depletion of the nodes along that path. A centralized mechanism will balance the traffic
load across various paths. However, in the absence of a centralized mechanism, it is challenging to
achieve long-term dynamic traffic load balance.
Clustering is a grouping technique that partitions a network into several clusters– each of
which has a clusterhead [13]. In WSNs, the selection of clusterheads that use energy efficient
clustering algorithms is very crucial as it they affect the lifetime and performance of the network.
Typically, a clusterhead is responsible for efficient communication between its cluster members and
other clusters. A cluster member communicates with its clusterhead that, in turn, communicates
with other clusterheads or the base station (BS)/sink of the network. Thus, the identification of
clusterheads must be done in a way that prolongs the lifetime of the entire network and improves
the overall scalability of the network. Chapter 5 of this dissertation addresses these routing and
clustering challenges.
With the adoption of newer networking technologies that enhance connectivity, we are
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witnessing an era of unprecedented networking attacks. Ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (CIA) of data, devices, networks, and users has become of utmost and critical impor-
tance. This becomes even more challenging in resource-constrained environments, such as WSNs,
where energy, computing, and communication resources are strictly limited. The design of ef-
fective defense strategies that guard against unauthorized intrusion has been impacted by the fast
of adoption of WSN applications. Energy, computing, and communication limitations of WSNs
make very challenging the development of security solutions. Typically, most academic research
has focused on a static model with a particular attack, or defense of security without consider-
ing: (i) the dynamic attack intensity or the dynamic environmental conditions of the system, and
(ii) the continuous interactions between the attackers and the defenders that lead to each of them
constantly adjusting their attack/defense strategies in order to gain the upper hand. However, in
the real world, these two phenomena exist in almost all network security problems. Thus, besides
finding a specific defense algorithm, it is equally or even more important to design a dynamic
defense system that can adjust its strategies to achieve the best defense performance against in-
telligent attackers under varying attack situations. In Chapter 6 of this dissertation, we argue that
the dynamic nature of attack intensity, network conditions, and the continuous interaction between
attackers and defenders must be considered in order to operate WSNs in a secure way.
Game theory provides many effective tools to model strategic interactions between entities.
Numerous areas of research have employed various concepts of a game theoretic approach involv-
ing conflict, cooperation, fairness, and competition. Game theory has been applied in different
areas of wireless communication for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the rational and selfish
behaviors of agents that may or may not be cooperative in nature. Nash equilibrium (NE) is a
significantly important solution concept in game theory, describing a steady state condition of the
game. Among the various models of computation in game theory, evolutionary game provides a
powerful modeling tool to 1) study the behavior of populations and 2) design efficient strategies in
communication networks.
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Although WSNs have achieved great success in many fields, research on this topic is still
far from fully-fledged in terms of both theory and application. More specifically, More specifically,
there are many open issues in developing better energy efficient and secure schemes for designing
WSNs. Therefore, it is essential to study two of the major issues in WSNs: energy efficiency
and security, while at the same time considering the characteristics of the sensor networks. These
characteristics give rise to numerous challenges in WSNs developments, which form the motivation
of this dissertation. In order to improve the energy efficiency and security designs of WSNs, we
based our research around four goals, which we will subsequently highlight. The first goal is to
design an energy efficient sensor MAC layer protocol. Designing an adaptive feedback approach
for energy-efficient WSNs is the second goal of this dissertation. The third goal is to formulate
an evolutionary game theoretic framework and an anti-coordination game for the efficiency of the
routing layer, and clustering. The last one is to design an energy efficient defense mechanism to
guard against several types of threats to WSNs while considering the limitations of the network
resources and the dynamic intensity of attacks.
1.2 Contributions
Motivated by the great potential of designing wireless sensor networks for different applica-
tions, as well as the limitations of the current research, we focus on energy efficiency and security
research in this dissertation. Specifically, this dissertation addresses the fundamental challenges
of designing WSNs. Its major contributions consists of energy efficiency and secure mechanisms
that are employed at various layers of the protocol stack in WSNs in order to ensure longevity
and trustworthiness of the nodes, and the networks. In addition, we focus on extending the sensor
nodes’ lifetimes while, at the same time maintaining the quality of service.
In our first contribution [14], EE-MAC, an Energy Efficient MAC layer protocol with vari-
able sleep intervals for WSNs is designed. This work is motivated by the well-known MAC pro-
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tocol S-MAC [9], in which nodes sleep in a periodic manner to reduce energy consumption. We
compute the duty-cycle usage of EE-MAC and propose the selection of sleep intervals based on a
two-state Markov model [15]. We define the duty cycle as the fraction of time a node is active and
that is used to define the consumed energy and the incurred delay. As for the objective function,
we propose a weighted linear combination of energy and delay after normalization. The objec-
tion function is then minimized to find the optimal value of the sleep time. Through extensive
simulations, we show how EE-MAC performs better compared with S-MAC in terms of energy
consumption and delay.
We further propose an additional solution for the energy efficiency challenge in WSNs
while considering the underlying dynamic traffic load [16]. In this study, we focus on extending
the sensor node’s lifetime by saving on energy consumption and keeping latency low. We intro-
duce an energy efficient dynamic, and adaptive sensing scheduling approach towards each sensor
node’s wake-up/sleep time called ADP. This approach adjusts the optimal sleeping period of each
sensor node adaptively according to three feed-back-driven factors: (1) the prediction of the next
occurrence time of an underlying sensing event, (2) the sensor node’s residual battery, and (3) the
importance of event reporting by this sensor node. Control of a sensor waking up can be internal
or external [17]. We follow the internally controlled wake-up policy, wherein the node periodically
wakes up (duty- cycling).
Our adaptive feedback approach (ADP) is designed to maximize a network’s lifetime and
save on energy consumption by optimizing the duty cycle of the nodes. When the frequency of
the sensing traffic is high, the node should be adjusted to wake up more frequently in order to
quickly report each sensing event without much latency. When the sensor node has a low battery
level, its sleeping time will be adjusted to be longer in order to extend its lifetime. When the
sensing event is more critical to report, the node wakes up more frequently in order to reduce the
reporting latency. Our simulation experiments showed that ADP could greatly extend a sensor
node’s lifetime compared with a well known scheduling base approach [18] without introducing
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much latency, which is especially suitable for a scenario when sensing events occur with varying
frequency.
Another area of focus in this dissertation involved the clustering and routing layer of the
WSNs protocol stack. Although the route selection problem of WSNs is a well-investigated prob-
lem, we are motivated to explore further the goal of alleviating energy consumption and reducing
collisions through a game theoretic framework. Game theory is a powerful mathematical tool that
has been applied to numerous areas of wireless communications for analyzing and predicting the
rational and selfish behaviors of various entities– the decisions of which determine the outcome of
the game [19].
In this dissertation, we leverage concepts from evolutionary game theory to model the rout-
ing decisions in a WSN as a non-cooperative evolutionary game [20]. We demonstrate that using
the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) in our routing game is an evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS), where there are no other strategies except this ESS that can dominate the population. The
payoff for every node, also referred to a s a player, is determined by the packet transmitting cost,
which varies based on the distance between the nodes. In the routing game, choosing the shortest
distance between the source and the next neighbor hop is beneficial for each player because the
shortest route will consume the least amount of energy for the transmission, thereby increasing
the payoff. The players who transmit the packets through the shortest path will gain a higher pay-
off (lower cost) compared with the players who transmit through longer paths. However, if every
player tries to select the shortest path to the target, it will result in collisions and lead to energy
depletion at the nodes. Thus, forwarding the packet through the lowest energy path may not always
be optimal way to extend network’s lifetime.
To model the adaptation of the hop selection strategies and to show the behavior of the
system over a period of time, we present the replicator dynamics of our game. We study how
the sensor nodes improve their strategy selection over time until they converge to an evolutionary
stable strategy. Furthermore, once the strategies converge to ESS, the population cannot be invaded
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by any other populations of the nodes, and the system will reach stability. The process of selecting
the path of transmission for the packets in our routing game continues until the destination node
is reached. The objective of the game is to reduce the load and avoid collisions on the most used
routes by distributing the data transmission task to all possible routes.
Furthermore, we take a game theoretic approach to devise a clustering algorithm for WSNs.
In our approach, the nodes are the players who play the clustering game. We propose a Cost and
Payment-based clustering Algorithm (CoPA) where we formalize the profits and losses for each
node. Coat and payment-based clustring algorithm divide the responsibility of a clusterhead among
the nodes, thereby balancing energy using a weighted metric that combines the transmission power
and energy of each node. Our anti-coordination clustering game is formulated for 2 players as well
as N players using only local information. We derived the correlated equilibrium (CE) for the
clustering game by determining the linear optimization. An adaptive regret matching (no-regret)
algorithm is used to guarantee convergence of the probability distribution to the CE. Moreover, we
determine the optimality of CE solution for the clustering game, and compared it to the pure and
mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) solutions in terms of efficiency and fairness among the
nodes. We also evaluated the performance of our clustering algorithm with two popular clustering
techniques, and demonstrate that CoPA has superior performance in terms of network lifetime and
system throughput.
Finally, we design a network-warfare framework, rooted in game theory, which considers
dynamic interactions and evolutions between attackers and defenders. We introduce a novel mech-
anism for defending against several types of attacks/threats on WSNs– a hyper defense mechanism
that considers the limitation of the resources as well as the security value of the network’s assets.
Our models defender responds suitably to attacks by considering the different intensities of at-
tacks and the relative cost to launch them. We model the interactions between the attackers and
defenders as a network-warfare game; this approach has proven to be a highly efficient mathe-
matical method to analyzing and modeling scenarios with conflicting objectives. Furthermore, in
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order to control future threats to the model’s security systems, game theory is useful in suggest-
ing various probable actions and in predicting their related outcomes. Ultimately, We develop a
non-cooperative zero-sum attacker-defender game. We formulate the security game between an
attacker and defender to study the dynamic interactions between rational players with conflicting
interests. In addition, we create optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker taking into
account that they can dynamically choose their strategies in order to maximize their payoff based
on cost minimization. Generally speaking, we classified the actions of attacking and defending
into three categories: Level Zero, Level One, and Level Two. The attacker can alternate between
these three strategies, where level zero represents no attack, level one represents a low intensity
of attack, and level two represents a high intensity attack. Likewise, we classified the defender’s
actions into three corresponding defense levels. For level zero, the defender decides to not defend
at all. The second one is a low level of defense, which may cost some of the resources (i.e., energy,
memory space, etc.). The third one is a high level of defense, which requires more computational,
battery power, or memory, but results in strong countermeasures against any threats. In practice,
the strategies of attackers and defenders for any network security problems could be categorized
into more fine-grained levels, but for the sake of clarity and modeling purposes, we believe such
a three-level classification of attack or defense is generalized enough and can well represents the
majority of attack and defense activities in real practice. Simulation results show that the proposed
system achieve a high level of performance compared to two other fixed-strategy defense systems.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we survey and discuss the signif-
icant literature review related to our study. In Chapter 3, we present an energy efficient medium
access control protocol for distributed wireless sensor networks. Chapter 4 presents a dynamic and
adaptive energy efficient approach for sensor networks. Two energy-efficient routing, and cluster-
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ing algorithms based on game theory in WSNs are proposed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we present
a game theoretic approach to modeling WSNs attack and defense strategies. Finally, Chapter 7
presents the simulation models and results. Conclusions and future works are drawn in Chapter 8.
12
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, a review of the relevant literature is surveyed to discuss and analyze the
research that has been done in this area, and determine the status of our current research within the
large paradigm of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) communication. We introduce the literature
pertaining to the energy efficient design in the medium access control layer, the feedback approach
design in any layers of the protocol stacks by utilizing sleeping technique, the energy efficient
design in the routing layer, and secure design in WSNs under game theoretic frameworks.
2.1 Medium Access Control (MAC) in WSNs
There is a rich literature on energy efficient MAC protocols in WSNs [21]. The proposed
protocols focus on reducing all sources of wasted energy such as idle listing or overhearing. Col-
lisions also waste energy due to the extra transmissions needed to handle the discarded packets.
Control packet overhead can consume extra energy by the unnecessary transition unless designed
according to the network requirements.
Ye et al. [9] proposed S-MAC, a contention-based MAC protocol for WSNs. S-MAC
establishes low-duty-cycle operation to reduce energy consumption on the sensor nodes by period-
ically putting nodes into sleep and active states. Nodes coordinate their sleep schedules rather than
having random sleep periods. Each node chooses a schedule and exchanges it with its neighbors
before starting its low-duty-cycle operation. The node select its time schedule randomly if it does
not hear any a schedule from another node. Then, the node broadcasts its schedule in a SYNC
message and the node receiving the schedule sets up the same schedule. T-MAC by van Dam and
Koe [22] performs better than S-MAC in terms of traffic load. The active period in T-MAC ends
when no activation occurs for a certain time. This can be advantageous for energy consumption but
it affects the channel throughput [8]. ADC-SMAC by Hu et al. [23] is another improved version of
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S-MAC, designed specifically for the chain and cross topologies. ADC-SMAC adjusts duty cycle
dynamically based on average sleeping delay, the upper and lower bound cycles.
QA-MAC by Gao [24], which is also based on S-MAC protocol, improves energy effi-
ciency by coordinating the contention window dynamically. AsyMAC by Wang et al. [25, 26]
is designed for wireless networks with asymmetric links. AsyMAC uses a set of concepts and
metrics characterizing the ability of MAC to silence nodes which could cause collisions. Adap-
tive Coordinated Medium Access Control (AC-MAC) protocol proposed by Ai et al. [27] is a
contention-based MAC protocol for WSNs. AC-MAC introduces adaptive duty cycle technique
that depends on the different loads of traffic and provides optimized trade-off strategies for energy,
throughput and latency.
DCMAC by Zheng et al. [28] uses a dynamic duty cycle with dynamic sleeping intervals
and a fixed listening interval. DCMAC reduces energy consumption and the latency by utilizing the
cooperation of the dual channel and the selection strategy for candidate nodes. Cho and Bahk [29]
use a multi-hop data packet in a single duty-cycle in Hop Extended MAC (HE-MAC) to set up
the path for multi-hop transmission. This approach also utilizes a state to extend the relay of
the packet beyond the start of the sleep period. The multi-token based MAC protocol with sleep
scheduling for WSNs [30] by Dash et al. aims to improve energy efficiency along with faster
data transmission, data aggregation, data accuracy and low latency in hop-by-hop delivery. The
limitation of this protocol is the high latency for finding a new neighbor. E-BMA by Shafiullah et
al. [31] is proposed to achieve energy efficiency for wireless data communication networks with
low and medium traffic. Sender-centric MAC (SC-MAC) by Liu et al. [32] is an asynchronous
duty cycling MAC protocol designed for bursty traffic loads. SC-MAC provides a collision free
environment without additional overhead. A latency optimization mechanism is also introduced
by SC-MAC for multi-hop networks.
Liu and Yao [33] propose An Appointment Based MAC Protocol (AB-MAC), which also
improves the asynchronous duty cycle and overcomes the effect of channel contention of multiple
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senders. AB-MAC utilizes a fusion appointment scheme to enable scheduled batch transmission
for multiple senders with low overhead to improve the transmission efficiency, latency and energy
efficiency in many-to-one traffic patterns.
2.2 Sleeping Techniques in any Layers of the Protocol Stack
Most WSN’s protocols have been based on application requirements. Recently, researchers
have been using sleeping techniques to reduce energy consumption in all layers of the protocol
stack in WSNs [17]. Previous works have shown a broad range of the use of sleeping techniques in
different categories. Sleeping techniques can be divided into scheduled wake-up, radio controlled
wake-up, and environmentally controlled wake-up. Scheduled wake-up is divided based on time
synchronization, where it could be synchronous or asynchronous duty cycling [17] [34].
(here!) ER-MAC [35] is a TDMA based MAC protocol that selects sleep and wake sched-
ules based on a node’s criticality, letting the more critical nodes sleep longer. As some studies
shown, sleeping techniques can also save energy in routing protocols [17]. [36] proposed a sleep-
ing multipath routing approach that can be applied to any routing protocol by selecting the mini-
mum number of disjoint paths to meet reliability demands and by turning off the rest of the sensor
nodes. GTC (Geographical Topology Control protocol) [37] extends the network’s lifetime by
dividing the network into zones and selecting one active node in each zone.
Sensors have two major operations: sensing and forwarding data [38]. In our dissertation,
we focused on producing an energy-efficient way to sense an event based on the feedback infor-
mation. Other researches, such as PW-MAC [39], focus on the forwarding and transmission of
sensed data. PW-MAC [39] is an energy-efficient predictive wakeup MAC protocol that enables
senders to accurately predict receivers wake-up times. This protocol minimized idle listing and
overhearing by enabling a sender to rendezvous with a receiver quickly according to the predicted
receiver wake-up time. It may be beneficial to combine PW-MAC techniques and our proposed
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approach to have a complete energy efficient scheduling system.
2.3 Routing and Clustering in WSNs under Game Theoretic Framework
In this section, some of the literature pertaining to the routing and clustering in WSNs
is provided as well as applications of some game theoretic solution concepts in the context of
communication networks.
2.3.1 Optimal Route in WSNs
Finding optimal routes is one of the most interesting research topics in communication
networks. Various research tools have been proposed to investigate this issue, including game
theory. Game theoretic techniques have been applied to numerous areas of wireless communication
for analyzing and predicting the rational behaviors of agents that have also proven very useful in
the design of WSNs [40]- [41]. Important and essential issues in WSNs, including routing protocol
design, energy saving, packet forwarding, security, and other sensor management tasks, have been
modeled and described by game theoretic approaches for efficient solutions that maximize network
lifetime. In one of our publications [20], we present a game theoretic model with utility functions
that consider forwarding and routing in the presence of adversaries.
The pricing and payment model is presented as a cooperative game in [42]. The goal of the
game is to find an optimal path in a WSN by considering reliability, energy, and traffic load, where
the nodes have incentives to cooperate in the game. Buttyan and Hubaux [43] proposed Nuglets,
which is virtual currency in the system, to stimulate the cooperation of the nodes participating in
forwarding packets in mobile ad hoc networks. Furthermore, a reliable length-energy constrained
routing scheme in WSNs has been presented in [44], where a game-theoretic approach is utilized.
In this approach, sensors cooperate as rational agents in order to find the optimal route and max-
imize their payoffs in the game. Two different possible payoff models and utility functions were
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illustrated.
The issue of energy efficiency in WSNs has been addressed in [45]. It provides a game
theoretic adaptive algorithm in order to manage sensor behavior for achieving complete decentral-
ized control in an energy-constrained sensor network. Evolutionary game theory has emerged as
a robust tool to investigate and solve dynamic networking issues. An evolutionary game theory
was applied in [46] where the authors proposed a three-dimensional game theoretic energy bal-
ance (3D-GTEB) routing protocol to enhance routing decisions and to decrease the overhead in a
WSN. They addressed the unbalanced energy consumption problem by applying evolutionary and
classical game theory at two levels of game theoretic decision-making. The two levels were called
wedge level energy balance and node level energy balance. In this dissertation, we formulated
this routing problem by utilizing an evolutionary game to study the behavior of the population and
induce equilibrium even under dynamic WSN conditions.
In [47], a joint duty cycle scheduling and energy aware routing approach (DREG) is pre-
sented based on evolutionary game theory. The proposed solution for this game is evolutionary
equilibrium. The authors aimed to prolong the network lifetime in WSNs by finding an optimal
wakeup/sleep scheduling policy, based on a trade-off between network throughput and energy effi-
ciency for each sensor. The issues of duty-cycle scheduling and energy conservation are modeled
as a multi-agent non-cooperative game, and the game is repeated until a steady state is reached.
Authors of [48] have also applied evolutionary game theory to solve the routing problem in a gen-
eral network topology. The authors also considered the link costs that are linear in the link flow.
Furthermore, authors of [49] model evolutionary game design to study the dynamic cooper-
ative behavior of selfish nodes under AODV routing. In this game, packet-forwarding is repeated,
and includes two distinct modes, in order to learn and predict neighbors’ node behavior to improve
network performance. The first mode is deterministic, analyzing the behavior of the network for
standard strategic patterns. Random mode is the second mode that applies a genetic algorithm
to predict the best strategy randomly. Proposed in [50] is an adaptive and distributed routing al-
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gorithm for correlated data that gathers and exploits the data correlation between nodes based on
a game theoretic framework.Specifically, the issue of effective energy minimization is addressed
and a routing solution is presented. The energy metric, interference awareness and opportunity
for multi-hop partial data aggregation are considered. The authors formulate the game by incor-
porating a general multi-hop data aggregation model into the problem definition to describe data
reduction in a congestion game.
A reliable delivery routing issue in WSNs is addressed in [51] through the game theoretic
framework. The authors aim to ensure stable cooperation among nodes for delivering the packet
while at the same time minimizing the routing costs. The proposed reliable coalition formation
routing protocol (RCFR) is presented using coalitional game theory, which selects the route ac-
cording to the principle of lowest cost. In order to introduce a fair allocation method for payoff
division, a characteristic function is designed by leveraging performance metrics. RCFR protocol
is elaborated by extending the AODV protocol, where the path with the lowest cost will be se-
lected to transmit packets, and route maintenance is achieved by adding route residual energy ratio
monitoring.
In our dissertation, we provide a game theoretic model, with utility functions, considering
forwarding and routing. We leveraged concepts from evolutionary game theory and modeled the
routing decisions in a WSN as an anti-coordination evolutionary game. We generated detailed
analysis of the system’s stability and fairness of the solution as well. The payoff for every node,
also referred to as a player, was determined by the packet transmitting cost, which depends on the
distance between the nodes. We studied the behavior of the population and induce equilibrium
even under dynamic network conditions [52].
2.3.2 Clustering in WSNs
Clustering in WSNs is an interesting topic especially when it is studied under the game
theoretic framework. Various clustering algorithms have been proposed such as the well-known
18
LEACH [53] where the mechanism of selecting a clusterhead to ensures rotation of the roles be-
tween the nodes in a probabilistic manner. Weighted clustering algorithm (WCA) [54] is another
clustering scheme that considers several metrics, including ideal degree, transmission power, mo-
bility, and battery power of the nodes. This algorithm can be optimized according to the particular
needs of the applications and adapt itself with changing topology of the network. Also, the algo-
rithm distributes the load as much as possible between the nodes, and it executes only on-demand,
instead of periodically.
In [55], the authors proposed an energy-efficient adaptive alustering hierarchy routing algo-
rithm based on game theory. The clusterhead selection is centralized and decided by the sink based
on the locations and remaining energy of the nodes. The authors show that the algorithm is suitable
for the statically distributed WSNs and is more energy-efficient than a random one. However, no
theoretical analysis has been provided besides the centralized selection mechanism that could lead
to higher energy consumption.
In CROSS [13] (Clustered Routing for Selfish Sensors), each sensor behaves selfishly in a
non-cooperative manner in order to conserve its energy. The authors provided the pure and mixed
strategy NE and the related expected payoffs of the games. The possibility of clusterhead absence
could occur continuously because of the dependency on selecting the clusterheads based on each
node’s probability. In [56], the authors proposed a clustering algorithm based on game theory
for energy efficiency in WSNs. The probability that a node serves as a clusterhead depends on
the energy model. Furthermore, a game theory based energy efficient CH selection approach is
proposed in [57] based on the Subgame Perfect NE (SPNE). The clusterheads are selected based
on SPNE decision.
In our dissertation, we attempted to provide a new solution from a game theory prescriptive
for clustering in WSNs. To that end, we studied the correlated equilibrium and its properties.
The CE achieves a strictly better performance compared to the NE and therefore maximizes the
network lifetime and throughput [58].
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2.4 Security in WSNs under Game Theoretic Framework
Security under a game theoretic framework is an interesting topic, where several proba-
ble actions along with the predicted outcome can be suggested through game theoretic methods
in order to control future threats. Game theory is suitable for modeling various issues and has
been successfully used in cyber security, including communication networks [59] [6] [60]. Vari-
ous issues in security and privacy in networking and mobile application have been addressed and
modeled through game theoretic frameworks [61].
In [62], the author addresses the issue of defending against denial-of-service (DoS) at-
tacks in the network and proposes a puzzle-based defense solution that can be distributed or non-
distributed using the concept of Nash equilibrium. A non-distributed DoS attack and the puzzle-
based defense were modeled as a two-player infinitely repeated game of discounted payoffs and an
optimal defense strategy that would be gained for the service provider. The defense strategy is de-
termined by the difficulty of the puzzle level. A distributed DoS attack is considered a two-player
stochastic game as well, and the solution is based on the non-distributed DoS solution.
The authors of [63] propose a Bayesian game approach for intrusion detection in wireless
ad hoc networks to analyze the interactions between pairs of attacking and defending nodes. The
concept of Nash equilibrium is utilized in both static and dynamic scenarios. A player can be
either a malicious or regular node. A defending node can choose to a monitor or not monitor,
whereas a malicious node can employ the attack or not attack strategy. Two methods are proposed
to reduce the resource consumption. The first method is adopting a probability of defending when
there is a sign of attack. The second one is employing two different monitors (i.e., lightweight and
heavyweight monitors).
In [64], a secure routing protocol is proposed by modeling the interaction of nodes in WSN
and intrusion detection system as a Bayesian game formulation. In the game, at least one player has
incomplete information about the other players, and each node/player has a reputation score. The
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selfish nodes can cooperate by sending the packets (to avoid detection) or dropping packets, and
malicious nodes are then eliminated from the network. Therefore, the nodes are motivated to act
rationally and gain the score of reputation through this approach. Two Bayesian Nash equilibriums
are provided to detect selfish nodes or to force selfish nodes to cooperate.
Unlike most security mechanisms that focus on a particular attack or defense, we provide
in this dissertation a dynamic defense system that considers variations in the intensity of attack and
defense [65].
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CHAPTER 3: EE-MAC: AN ENERGY EFFICIENT SENSOR MAC
LAYER PROTOCOL
3.1 Overview
Energy efficiency is of utmost importance for wireless sensor networks deployed without
any possibility of battery replenishment. In this chapter, we propose an Energy Efficient Medium
Access Control protocol (EE-MAC) for wireless sensor networks, which achieve a low-duty-cycle
and low energy consumption through optimized sleep intervals based on a 2-state Markov model.
The duty cycle is defined as the fraction of time a node is active. Energy consumption, and the
incurred delay when the node switch between sleep and active states, are defined as well. We
formulate a weighted linear combination in order to find the optimal sleep time for each node.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes details of the proposed
EE-MAC protocol, and section 3.3 provides a summary of the chapter.
3.2 EE-MAC Protocol
The main goal of EE-MAC is to reduce energy consumption and to optimize delay per-
formance. This goal is achieved by determining the optimal value of the sleep interval based on
prevailing conditions. EE-MAC changes the state of each node between sleep and active. During
the sleep state, a node’s radio is turned off which decreases the power consumption. During the
active state, the node wakes up and listens, receives, or transmits data. As a result, the consumed
power increases.
3.2.1 State Model
The node activities in EE-MAC can be represented using the Gilbert-Elliott model [15] [66].
This 2-state Markov model is shown in Fig. 3.1 where transitions from ‘sleep’ state to ‘active’ state
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occurs with probability Psa. Similarly, transitions from ‘active’ state to ‘sleep’ state occurs with
probability Pas. Transitions from each state to itself is also shown. Thus, the probability of being
in the active state is:
Pa = Psa + Paa.
Similarly, the probability of being in the sleep state is:
Ps = Pas + Pss.
It is to be noted that we do not treat receiving, transmitting, and listening as different states as they
are included in the ‘active’ state.
as
P
P
sa
Pss Paa
Sleep Active
Figure 3.1: 2-state (active and sleep) Markov model.
It is assumed that the active times and sleep times are exponentially distributed. Let us
define ta as the average time a node spends in the active state. Similarly, ts is the average time a
node spends in the sleep state. Thus, we can define the duty cycle of the node as:
ρ =
ta
ta + ts
i.e., the fraction of time the node is active. It can be noted that, Pa = ρ and Ps = (1− ρ).
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3.2.2 Energy and Delay
Although it is desirable to have a low duty cycle, it compromises the delay performance.
For instance, if a node sleeps while there is data transmission to it, the node will incur some delay
in its response, which increases as the sleep times become longer. Thus, while optimizing the
sleep intervals, the deterioration in the delay response must be taken into account. Given different
energy consumptions of two states, we define the total energy consumed per unit time per node, E,
as follows:
E = EActive + ESleep (3.1)
where EActive is the average energy consumed per unit time in active state and ESleep is the average
energy consumed per unit time in sleep state. If Wa and Ws are the energy consumed per unit time
during the active and sleep states respectively, then EActive = ρWa and ESleep = (1− ρ)Ws. Thus,
the total consumed energy is defined as follows:
E = ρWa + (1− ρ)Ws (3.2)
For a sleeping node, the expected time to wake is ts, irrespective of the time it has been
sleeping. This is a result of the assumption of exponential sleep time distribution, hence memory-
less. Thus, delay can be defined as D = ts.
3.2.3 Normalization of Energy and Delay
To include both energy E and delay D in a combined metric, we must normalize them in a
way so that they map to a number between 0 and 1. If we assume max(Wa,Ws) = Wa as energy
spent in active mode is more than the energy spent in the sleep mode, then the maximum value for
E is Wa. This happens when ρ = 1, i.e., the node is always in the active state. Thus, we define the
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normalized energy, Enorm, as:
Enorm =
ρWa + (1− ρ)Ws
Wa
(3.3)
Similarly, we seek a function for D such that when ts → 0, D → 0 and when ts → ∞, D → 1.
We define the normalized delay, Dnorm, as Dnorm = 1− 1ts .
3.2.4 Combined Metric
We define the combined metric as a linear combination of Enorm and Dnorm as:
U = w1 × Enorm + w2 ×Dnorm (3.4)
where w1 and w2 are the corresponding weighing factors and w1 + w2 = 1.
We seek to find the value of ts for which U will be minimized. Thus, we take partial
derivatives and equate to 0. Thus,
[
∂U
∂ts
]
=
[
∂Enorm
∂ts
]
+
[
∂Dnorm
∂ts
]
= 0 (3.5)
Solving equation (3.5), we get
ts =
√
w1Wata − w2Wa
Wsw1ta
(3.6)
For ts to have a real value, w1 ta ≥ w2.
3.3 Summary
Achieving energy efficiency in WSNs is of utmost importance. Since sensor nodes con-
sume more power while sensing and transmitting compared to idle time, achieving a low duty
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cycle improves the performance in terms of energy consumption. We achieve this goal by putting
nodes to sleep at the cost of degraded delay performance. We presented energy efficient medium
access control layer protocol, Energy Efficient MAC layer protocol, called EE-MAC. We derived
the energy consumption and the incurred delay when the node switches between the two states
(i.e.,sleep and an active state). We also proposed a combined metric which is a linear sum of the
two and find the optimal sleep time.
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CHAPTER 4: ADP: AN ADAPTIVE FEEDBACK APPROACH FOR
ENERGY-EFFICIENT WSNs
4.1 Overview
Numerous design of WSNs has been considered in order to satisfy the requirements of real-
world applications. One of the most common approaches for energy conservation is to alternate
each sensor node between sleep and wake-up states in order to address the challenges aspect of
protocols design: limited battery power in the sensor nodes. In this chapter, ADP is proposed as
ADaPtive energy efficient approach that meets the requirement of low energy consumption and,
at the same time, considers the underlying dynamic traffic load. ADP enhances energy efficiency
by dynamically adjusting sensor nodes’ sleep and wake-up cycles. ADP thereby utilizing a cost
function to strike a balance between the conflicting goals of conserving energy (waking up as rarely
as possible) and minimizing sensed events’ reporting latency (waking up as frequently as possible),
simultaneously. It also constantly monitors and provides feedback concerning the residual energy
level and the importance of the event to be reported, as well as predicting the next sensing event
occurrence time.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 highlights the motivation for
the proposed idea. In section 4.3, we present the ADP approach. Section 4.4 is a further detailed
discussion. Finally, we summarize the chapter in section 4.5.
4.2 Motivation for the Proposed Idea
In all layers of the protocol stack in wireless sensor networks, sleeping techniques for re-
ducing energy consumption have been used by researchers to satisfy the application requirements
of the protocols design [17]. Sensors have two major operations: sensing and forwarding data [38].
In this chapter, we focus on producing an adaptive and energy-efficient scheduling approach for
27
sensors to sense and report events. It can be readily combined with many previous developed sys-
tems that focus on energy-efficient data forwarding in order to have a completely energy efficient
scheduling system that covers both data sensing and data forwarding operations of sensors. Com-
pared with a well-known scheduling base approach [18], our simulation experiments show that
ADP can extend a sensor node’s lifetime without introducing much latency, an especially suitable
for a scenario since sensing events can occur with varying frequency. Our approach can be used on
different scenarios of underlying sensing events. Other research studies, such as [39], has focused
on the forwarding and transmission of sensed data. Part of our research puts forth a new dynamic
and adaptive scheduling approach that aims to adjust the optimal sleeping period of each sensor
node adaptively according to the following: the importance of reporting an event for this sensor
node, the prediction of the next occurrence time of an underlying sensing event, and the sensor
node’s residual battery. The ADaPtive energy approach (ADP) is designed to maximize network
lifetime and save on energy consumption by optimizing the duty cycle of the node. The node
should be adjusted to wake-up more frequently when it senses traffic is high in order to quickly re-
port each sensing event without much latency. In order to extend its lifetime, the sensors’ sleeping
time will be adjusted when the sensor node has a low battery level. Conversely, the node should
wake-up more frequently when the sensing event is more critical, thereby reducing the reporting
latency.
4.3 Proposed ADP Approach
4.3.1 Wake-up Technique
Waking a node up and putting it to sleep periodically instead of keeping the node awake all
the time saves significant amount of energy. A periodical scheduling technique could be synchro-
nized, where all the nodes will adjust to the periodic wake-up time synchronously. On the other
hand, the scheduling technique could be asynchronous, where each node’s wake-up time does not
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require any synchronization, and each node can adjust its own periodic wake-up time indepen-
dently [67]. Some existing approaches [18] use a base approach of wake-up technique that gives
a node a fixed period of sleeping time throughout the node’s lifetime. In the base approach, the
node wakes up after a fixed amount of time, which is not suitable with dynamic changing sensing
events. As an example application, sensors for monitoring a bridge condition may have very dy-
namically changing sensing activities to monitor and report throughout a day. During rush hours,
sensor nodes will be busy and need to be awake more frequently to report sensing events than
during nighttime, when vehicular traffic over the bridge is dramatically decreased. Clearly, fixed
wake-up time scheduling depletes sensor nodes an unnecessary high amount of energy at night,
and at the same time, sensor nodes may not wake up quickly enough during rush hours in order to
sense and report events on time. In contrast, our approach adapts the node waking up scheduling
based on the occurrence frequency of environmental events.
Although ADP runs on each sensor node independently, if some sensor nodes have exactly
the same settings and observe the same sequence of events, executing ADP on these sensors will
enable them to have identical sleep/wake-up scheduling, i.e., they are in synchronous mode. On
the other hand, two sensors are in asynchronous mode if they have different settings or observe
different events. Therefore, we can say that ADP is a hybrid approach by combining synchronous
and asynchronous modes.
4.3.2 Criticality of Sensor Node
Unlike existing methods, where all nodes are treated equally all the time, we treat each
node in ADP according to its own conditions (which we call criticality), and adapt its sleep/wake-
up duty cycle with underlying sensing traffic density. We measure the criticality of a sensor node
by the following two parameters:
• Residual energy of a sensor node: each node has its own residual energy level, and it varies
29
according to the node activity and past energy consumption during its lifetime.
• Importance of reporting data: due to the application requirements, types of sensing data,
and node locations, each node could have different values measuring the importance of re-
porting events it needs to sense and report.
4.3.3 Sensing Event Modeling and Prediction
The static behavior of the traditional system under varying sensing event density may in-
crease the energy wastage and could reduce the efficiency of a sensor network. The main idea of
ADP is to adjust the optimal sleeping time for each node and to adapt the network sensor node to
be appropriate with an environmental dynamic-changing traffic load. In ADP, a sensor node will
stay awake for a certain amount of time. If there is no event to report, it will go back to sleep
immediately; if there is an existing event to report, it will report the data and then go back to sleep.
Its next wake-up time is determined according to the node’s criticality and the prediction of the
next event arrival time.
We assume that the underlying sensing events follow the Poisson Distribution with the
dynamically changing rate λt at time t. We estimate λt in each sleep/wake-up cycle based on
previous observations of event arrivals (i.e., the Ti sequence) and the prior estimated value of λt
(denoted by λt′). We apply the idea of estimating the new arrival rate via a low-pass filter [68].
λt = (1− α)λi + αλt′ (4.1)
where λi is the Poisson arrival rate based on the most recent arrival event, λt is estimated arrival
rate, and α is a filter gain coefficient to adjust how smooth we want the estimated λt.
Here we explain how we obtain λi based on the most recent observation. Figure 4.1 illus-
trates sensing events occurrence over time. We denote Ti as the inter-arrival time between the i-th
event and the previous (i − 1)-th event. Since we assume that sensing events follow the Poisson
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arrival process, and sensor nodes know when each previous event happened, we use the observed
most recent inter-arrival time Ti to estimate the current time Poisson process rate λi, and, hence,
we set the value of λi as:λi = 1Ti .
For reader’s convenience, we list the main mathematical notations used in this paper in
Table 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of sensing events arrival. Ti is the inter-arrival time between the i-th event
and the previous (i − 1)-th event; λi is the estimated Poisson arrival rate based on Ti where λi =
1/Ti.
4.3.4 Feedback Optimization
4.3.4.1 Feedback Optimization Model for General Distribution
Our proposed approach is based on optimizing a cost function with the goal of minimizing
the cost of energy consumed while matching with traffic density and maintaining an acceptable
latency. The optimization tries to achieve a balanced trade-off between the energy consumption
and sensing data report latency. There are two types of cost that we consider in our formula:
• The cost of energy wastage when the node wakes up without any sensing event happening
during its previous sleep period.
• The cost of sensing data report latency when the node is sleeping during the occurrence of
an event, thus introducing a time delay when it wakes up and reports the event.
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The first case happens when the occurrence frequency of underlying sensing events is low
and the node wakes up too often. The node will consume an undesired amount of energy in that
awake time without reporting any events. In the second case, the cost of latency becomes high
when the occurrence frequency of underlying sensing events is high, and the node wakes up less
frequently. In this case, the sensor node sleeps longer than desired, whereas there are some events
the node needs to report more responsively. Let random variable X denote the inter-arrival time
between sensing events. We define the general formula of the combined cost function as:
f(ts) = w1rP + w2cdtsQ (4.2)
where r represents the criticality of remaining battery of a sensor node, c represents the
importance of a sensed event, and ts is sleeping time. The average latency is represented by dts .
P = Prob.(X > ts) is the probability of wasting energy when waking up in the absence of a
sensing event (first case); Q = Prob.(X ≤ ts) is the probability of finding an event occurrence
during the prior sleep period (second case).
w1 and w2 are weight factors that should be set up by the network operator to achieve a
balance between energy saving and data report latency. The cost function shows that the absolute
values of w1 and w2 do not matter; what matters is the relative values of these two weight factors.
Thus we can let:
w1 + w2 = 1 (4.3)
In order to find the optimal sleeping time t∗s based on the cost function (4.2), we just need
to take partial derivative of the cost function against ts and set it equal to zero, as ∂f∂ts
∣∣∣∣
t∗s
= 0.
4.3.4.2 Feedback Optimization Model based on Poisson Distribution
The above optimization model based on general distribution is theoretical and abstract. In
order to illustrate how we can utilize this feedback optimization model in many sensor network
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applications, in this section we describe the traffic arrival process as a Poisson distribution and
explain how to use the feedback optimization model to improve energy efficiency in a concrete
way.
Table 4.1: List of Notations
Notation Definition
λt The dynamic Poisson arrival rate for sensing events at time t
λt Estimated Poisson arrival rate at time t for sensing events
Ti Inter-arrival time between the (i− 1)-th event and i-th event
ts Sleeping time
ξ Remaining battery of sensor node
r Critical factor of remaining battery of sensor node, r = 1
ξ
c Factor of importance of reporting sensed event
P Prob. of wasting energy when a sensor node wakes up without any event
to report
Q Prob. of finding event occurred during the sensor node’s prior sleep
period
dts Average sensing data report latency
w1, w2 Weight factors in cost function, where w1 + w2 = 1
t∗s Optimal sleeping time
Poisson distribution is the most suitable distribution for the majority of sensor network
applications. If there exist a large number of entities each of which has a very small probability
to independently generate sensing events, then such event occurrence can be modeled accurately
by a Poisson distribution. One example of such an application is in using sensors to monitor the
condition of a bridge and the traffic flowing over it. There could be millions of vehicles in the local
area of the bridge, but the probability of any one vehicle going over the bridge at a specific time is
very small. A similar instance can be found in sensors monitoring wildlife, where the population of
wildlife is large, but the probability of a specific animal appears in the specific area for the sensor
to detect is small.
As we described above, X represents the inter-arrival time between sensing events. Since
we assume the sensing event occurrence follows the Poisson process with a dynamically changing
33
rate λ, this random variable X follows exponential distribution with the same rate λ. (X > ts)
denotes the absence of a sensing event during the time interval [0, ts]. The probability of absence
of sensing event when waking up is Prob.(X > ts), which is given by the following formula:
P = Prob.(X > ts) = e
−λts (4.4)
Similarly, the probability of event occurrence during the sleep time interval [0, ts] is:
Q = Prob.(X ≤ ts) = 1− e−λts (4.5)
Because of the following Poisson process Theorem: “Given that N(t = n), then those
n arrival times S1, ..., Sn have the same distribution as the order statistics corresponding to n in-
dependent random variables uniformly distributed on the time interval (0, t)” [69], we define the
average latency dts in our cost function (4.2) as half of the sleeping time dts =
ts
2
.
In addition, we define the critical factor of remaining battery of a sensor node as r = 1
ξ
,
where ξ is the fraction of remaining battery energy as compared with the battery’s full capacity.
The importance of sensed events parameter c is specified manually by the operator for each sensor
node according to its location and sensing data type.
After deriving the formulas for all the variables, the cost function becomes:
f(ts) = [w1
1
ξ
(e−λts)] + [w2c
ts
2
(1− e−λts)] (4.6)
In the above cost function equation, the first part is the cost of wasting energy, and the
second part represents the cost of sensing data report latency. In order to drive the optimal sleeping
time t∗s, we need to take partial derivative of the cost function (4.6) in terms of ts. Since we don’t
know the true value of λ, we use the estimated λt from Equation (4.1) in the cost function. The
optimal sleeping time t∗s should make the derivative equal to zero, which means that t
∗
s can be
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derived from the following equation:
∂f
∂ts
∣∣∣∣
t∗s
=
w2c
2
+ e−λtt
∗
s [
w2ct
∗
sλt
2
− λtw1
ξ
− w2c
2
] = 0 (4.7)
Algorithm 4.1: Procedure of proposed adaptive scheduling approach (ADP).
Result: Each node computes the optimal sleep time period t∗s for the next
sleep-wake duty cycle, determines the next wake-up time
Initialization: The network operator sets the values of data importance
factor c for each sensor node and sets the value of weight factors w1
and w2 in order to achieve a balance between energy saving and data
report latency;
begin
When a node wakes up
1. Prediction: estimate the new λ¯t using Equation 4.1 based on past
observations and prior estimated value.
2. Updating: update the feedback information, i.e., derive r = 1ξ and λt.
3. Optimization: derive t∗s based on Equation 4.7 by using the feedback
value of r = 1ξ and the estimated Poisson arrival rate λt.
if event has happened during prior sleep period then
Action (i.e., report the event);
end
Schedule the node next wake-up time:;
next-wake-up-time=current-time + t∗s ;
The node goes to sleep.
end
Since Equation (4.7) does not have a closed-form solution, we apply Bisection algorithm [70]
for estimating the root of the Equation (4.7). When a node wakes up, its value of r = 1
ξ
updates
based on the current remaining battery energy. In addition, the estimated event arrival rate λt up-
dates by the estimation Equation (4.1), then ADP relies on Equation (4.7) to determine the node’s
optimal sleeping time t∗s for the next round.
Algorithm (4.1) shows the procedure of the proposed adaptive scheduling approach. It
contains three steps in each wake-up cycle: prediction, updating, and optimization. The first step,
Prediction, is used to predict when will the next sensing event will happen based on the event’s
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statistical model and the previous events observation. It will make the system adaptive to the
dynamics of sensing events. The second step, Updating, is to update all the parameters in the cost
function (4.6). The last step, Optimization, is to derive the optimal next-round sleeping time t∗s
based on the partial derivative (4.7).
4.4 Discussion
Our feedback optimization model is not restricted to the Poisson process. The model of
sensing event occurrence could follow different distributions according to the sensor network ap-
plications, such as Pareto distribution, ON/OFF Markov models [71], and Weibull distribution.
Figure 4.2 shows this simulation-based configuration process. The values of weight factors
w1 and w2 in our feedback optimization model (4.2) are critical for system performance. Their
values can be configured in two ways by the sensor network operator: first, based on the experience
of the operator and on the previous usage of the system. Second, if the operator has the model for
the sensor network application based on previous observations, the optimal values of w1 and w2
can be defined by running the simulation of the system (like what we did in our performance
evaluation) repeatedly to achieve the best simulation results.
Figure 4.2: Simulation-based framework for designing weight factors w1 and w2 based on exis-
tence model.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, an ADaPtive feedback approach is introduced, called ADP, for wireless
sensors. It aims to effectively extend the network lifetime by saving on energy consumption and
keeping data sensing report latency low. ADP utilizes a cost function intended to strike a balance
between the conflicting goals of conserving energy and at the same time minimizing sensed events
reporting latency. Also, a feedback mechanism that constantly monitors residual energy level and
the importance of the event to be reported are incorporated, as well as predicts the next sensing
event occurrence time.
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CHAPTER 5: ENERGY-EFFECINT ROUTING AND CLUSTRING
ALGORITHMS UNDER GAME THEORTIC FRAMEWORK
5.1 Basics of Game Theory
Game theory is a powerful mathematical tool that models strategic interaction and analysis
of competition, conflict, or cooperation between multiple entities, and the constraints and payoffs
associated with actions are taken into consideration. Fundamentally, game theory is the study
of decision-making and the analysis of the behavior of two or more participants in a situation
involving rewards or punishments. Different techniques can be utilized to perform tactical analysis
of the all possible situations.
A player can be a person, sensor node, machine, or group of any entities within a game.
Players are a basic entity in a game and may be either cooperative or non-cooperative while aiming
to maximize their outcomes according to their preference (utility function). The utility in any game
is expressed by the motivation of the players. The resolution of the game involves a systematic
description of how the game will be played through employing the best/optimal possible strategies
and the related outcomes. A strategy is a player action within the context of the game; it describes
a complete plane of each player’s choices in all possible situations. The strategy can be either a
pure or mixed strategy; pure strategy is specific to take a unique action for the player in a situation,
and a mixed strategy specifies a probability distribution for all possible actions [60, 72].
A fundamental concept of game theory is the ability to examine the huge number of pos-
sible situations, and game theory also provides different methods for suggesting several probable
actions along with the predicted outcome. Nash Equilibrium (NE) is one of the most significant
common solution that describes a steady state condition of the game; no player can benefit by
changing her/his strategy while the other players keep their strategies unchanged. Also, this so-
lution does not specify how the steady state in the game can be reached. Nash Equilibrium can
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be classified into two major types: Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) and Mixed Nash Equilibrium
(MNE). MSN is a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies.
Evolutionary game theory is another elegant expression in game theory that models and
studies the evolution of the population, along with the interaction among rational agents; evo-
lutionary game theory identifies the optimal strategies that evolve over time by focusing on the
dynamics of strategic change (i.e., strategy adaptation over time). The evolutionary game ap-
proach provides an effective modeling tool to describe and analyze models of population behavior
as well as the design of efficient strategies in communication networks. Compared to classical
game theory, evolutionary game theory focuses more on the dynamics of strategy change, and the
decision processes can be seen as the strategy evolution over time. An evolutionary stable strategy
is a behavior that, when adopted by a population of players, cannot be invaded by an alternative
strategy.
5.2 Overview
One of the major challenges associated with wireless sensor networks (WSNs) involves
extending the network’s lifetime by minimizing energy consumption. One of the ways to minimize
energy consumption is to reduce network congestion, as congestion increases delays and introduces
additional packet collisions— thus, adversely affecting network performance. The heterogeneity
of the paths can be in the sense that each path is associated with different costs according to the
various routing metrics. Paths with lower-cost in terms of transmission energy are more attractive
to sensor nodes as compared with higher-cost paths. However, if every node tries to select the
shortest path to its target, collisions will result and energy among nodes will become quickly
depleted. Thus, forwarding packets through the lowest energy-consumed path may not always
be optimal for the network lifetime. As a result, nodes are expected to have a clear preference
over a set of available paths; every sensor node should have an incentive to behave altruistically to
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avoid collisions that lead to overheads retransmitting dropped packets, which can cause additional
depletion of energy.
The selection of clusterheads using energy efficient clustering algorithms in WSNs is an-
other crucial issue in design of WSN algorithms. As clusterheads and cluster members (i.e., non-
clusterhead nodes) have different energy consumption rates, all nodes must adpot some rational
scheme so that connectivity and the proper functioning of the network is not compromised.
In this chapter, we address the challenges that emerg because of the absence of a cen-
tralized enforcement mechanism and present an evolutionary routing congestion game that would
ensure long-term routing with a fair distribution of heterogeneous paths among sensor nodes. We
develope the game’s evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and prove that the derived incumbent strat-
egy cannot be invaded by a greedy strategy (i.e., mutant strategy). Furthermore, we identify the
replicator dynamic of the proposed game in order to show the behavior of the sensors in selecting
the paths. The mechanism of the replicator dynamics also shows how the nodes learn from their
strategic interactions and modify their strategies at every stage of the game until reaching a stable
strategy (ESS). In addition, we propose a Cost and Payment-based clustering Algorithm (CoPA)
for achieving energy efficiency in WSNs under a game theoretical framework. The analysis is
based on a non-cooperative, repeated general-sum game, where each node behaves selfishly in
order to maximize its lifespan (payoff). We demonstrate that the correlated equilibrium is a practi-
cal solution for clusterhead selection, which provides better performance than the Nash Equilibria.
Correlated equilibrium provides a balance between the fully cooperative solution and the fully non-
cooperative solution in terms of implementation overhead. CoPA produces a balanced distribution
of responsibilities and energy consumption between the sensor nodes as well as maximizing the
minimum payoff for every node.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: the details of an evolutionary game for
efficient routing in WSNs are proposed in subsection 5.3. In subsection 5.4, we propose a Cost
and Payment-based clustering Algorithm (CoPA) for achieving energy efficiency in WSNs under
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a game theoretical framework in particular. A summary is drawn in the last section 5.5 of this
chapter.
5.3 An Evolutionary Game for Efficient Routing in WSNs
In this section, we take an evolutionary game theoretic approach to analyze the routing
congestion issue in order to show how sensor nodes in a WSN could evolve their routing strategies
to transmit data packets in an efficient and stable manner. We derive the equilibrium state for the
routing game and prove that there is no mutant— an individual node that adopts another strategy to
invade the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). In addition, we introduce a replicator dynamic model
to show the behavior of nodes with various strategies over time. Aiming to alleviate congestion
and thereby improves the network lifetime, we propose equilibrium solutions.
The rest of the section is organized as follows: We highlights the motivation for the idea
in section 5.3.1. System model and assumptions are proposed in Section 5.3.2. Game structure,
investigation of the NE and ESS, and fairness analysis of the game solution are proposed in sec-
tion 5.3.3.
5.3.1 Motivation for the Proposed Idea
One of the most motivating research topics in communication networks is finding optimal
routes. Game theory is one of research tools that have been proposed to investigate the routing
issue, where game theoretical methodologies have been successfully used in sensor networks [41].
A game theoretic model featuring utility functions that consider forwarding and routing in the pres-
ence of adversaries is introduced in this section. Although route selection problem in a WSN is
a well investigated problem, we are motivated to explore in greater depth how to alleviate energy
consumption and collisions using a game theoretic framework. Evolutionary game theory provides
a useful modeling tool of the various models of computation in game theory to design the strate-
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gies and study the behavior of populations in communication networks. We leverage concepts
from evolutionary game theory to model the routing decisions in a WSN as a non-cooperative evo-
lutionary game. The mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) in our routing game is proven to be an
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS); there are no other strategies except this ESS that can dominate
the population. The payoff for every node, also referred to as a player1, is determined by the packet
transmitting cost, which in turn depends on the distance between the nodes.
Choosing the shortest distance between the source and the next neighbor hop is preferable
for each player in the routing game because it will consume the least amount of energy for the trans-
mission, thereby increasing the payoff. The players who transmit the packets through the shortest
path will gain a higher payoff/lower cost compared with the players who transmit through longer
paths. Selection of the shortest path to the target by every player, however, results in collisions and
leads to energy depletion. Thus, forwarding the packet through the lowest energy path may not
always be optimal for the network lifetime. The replicator dynamics of our game demonstrates the
behavior of the system over a period of time and models the adaptation of the hop selection strate-
gies. We study how the sensor nodes improve their strategy selection over time until they converge
in an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). In addition, the population cannot be invaded by any other
node’s populations once the strategies converge to ESS, and the system reaches stability. Reducing
the load and avoiding collision on the most used routes by distributing the data transmission tasks
on all possible routes is the game’s objective.
5.3.2 System Model and Assumptions
5.3.2.1 System Model
We consider an anti-coordination routing game where there is a set of N homogeneous
sensors (i.e., players) that are randomly distributed in a designated area. Each player has to
1Throughout this chapter, we use the terms player and node interchangeably.
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select a path to transmit packets. We model the set of next hops that are available for a node
R = {1, 2, 3, ..r}. We consider a routing game where each packet’s path is controlled indepen-
dently by a rational player in order to minimize the cost of transmission and latency. Furthermore,
each node takes its own decision to transmit a packet without cooperation with other nodes. Each
selected hop (i.e., hop r) has a specific cost Cr which is related to the distance between the trans-
mitter and receiver (different hops sustain diverse transmission energy costs). For example, if the
distance between the next hop and the transmission node is increased, the cost of transmission
will also increase. This is because all receivers must have the signal to interference and noise
ratio (SINR) above a certain threshold in order to decode received signals correctly. Players are
assumed to be non-cooperative and rational, i.e., they are interested in minimizing their own cost
of transmission and they do not share a common goal to cooperate with each other. The energy
model will determine the transmission cost C and payoff u for selecting a specific hop, which will
be introduced in the following subsection. As demonstrated subsequently, the evolutionary game
is concerned with the evolution of the strategies, payoffs, and stability [73]. Thus, the number of
sensor nodes is not significant in the game model.
5.3.2.2 Cost Model
Most of the sensors’ energy is used during packet forwarding. Many energy models [74, 75]
have been used for energy consumption in WSNs. In our model, the total cost C of forwarding
a packet consists of two parts: i) the energy spent for transmitting the packet and ii) the energy
consumed for receiving the packet. Thus,
C = Ctx(d) + Crx (5.1)
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where Ctx(d) is the cost of transmitting the packet to another over distance d, and Crx is the cost
of receiving it. Ctx is defined as:
Ctx(d) = e(tx−elec) + eamp · dα (5.2)
where etx−elec is the energy consumption of the transmission circuit, and eamp is the transmit am-
plifier dissipation in order to achieve the required signal level. α represents the propagation loss
exponent (i.e., typically α = 2 for free space). The cost of receiving the packet is:
Crx = e(rx−elec) (5.3)
where e(rx−elec) is the receiving circuitry dissipation. In our game model, it is noteworthy that any
other positive value for the cost of packet forwarding derived from other energy models can be
used in the game without affecting our analysis and the outcome.
5.3.2.3 Assumptions and Notations
The assumptions of the incentive game model are as following:
• Populations: All sensor nodes are grouped into several populations according to their ge-
ographical positions, and we model the game as an asymmetric routing game between two
populations (i.e., υ = {A,B}). All nodes in each population have the same strategy set and
payoff matrix. In an evolutionary game, the number of nodes does not play any role in the
game model, where the payoff of a strategy depends on the strategy adopted by the others,
but not on who is playing the strategy [76].
• Strategy space: Each node has a set of available actions/strategies represented as S =
{sr|r ∈ R}, whereR is the set of next hops available in the game.
• Payoffs and cost: Obtaining the nearest hop will result in a lower transmission cost and thus a
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higher payoff. Similarly, selecting a farther hop will result in a higher transmission cost and a
lower payoff. The next hops selected by different players simultaneously may interfere with
each other, raising the contention situation, and wasting the transmission energy of all nodes
in question. Each selected hop for either node will incur a specific amount of energy that is
the cost of transmitting the packet. This cost is denoted by C (as was defined in equation
( 5.23)). As an example, selecting r as the next hop to transmit the packet individually from
population A will cost CAr.
• Non-cooperative behavior: All sensor nodes are independent as they do not cooperate with
each other for a common goal. Nodes are expected to have a clear preference of selecting the
best paths over a set of available choices, and the nodes are always interested in transmitting
packets through the route with the least possible minimum cost (i.e., the minimum value of
C). Each node needs to recognize its neighbor nodes, the distances, and the cost of the packet
transmission through each available route. Therefore, if many nodes take this same routing
strategy, this rational behavior of sensor modes will intuitively result in further congestion
and lead to energy depletion of the nodes along those paths.
For reader’s convenience, we list the main mathematical notations and acronyms in Table 5.1.
5.3.3 An Evolutionary Routing Game
In this section, we first provide some basic concepts of evolutionary game theory as well
as the structure of our routing game. Then, we derive the equilibrium state for the game as a
solution for 2-hop scenario, followed by extension for multi-hop scenario by driving the so-called
Replicator Dynamics of the game.
The incentive anti-coordination routing game proposed in this paper is a non-cooperative
repeated game with perfect information, where the nodes have perfect knowledge about the utility
function, which is common information to all nodes. The nodes are able to know other nodes’
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selection and their payoffs in the past. Furthermore, each node in WSNs behaves rationally and
selfishly in order to obtain the best route to forward his own packets with minimum cost of energy
consumption (maximizing the own utility).
The evolutionary game provides an effective modeling tool to describe and analyze models
of population behavior as well as design efficient strategies in communication networks. The
difference compared with a classical game theory is that evolutionary game theory focuses more on
the dynamics of strategy change, where the decision processes can be seen as the strategy evolution
over time. An evolutionary stable strategy is a behavior that, when adopted by a population of
players, cannot be invaded by an alternative strategy. In this paper, we consider the action of
selecting a specific hop as nodes’ strategy in our routing game. We need to provide the evolutionary
stability analysis of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
(MSNE) in the game in order to seek a fair and stable solution for the long term. In addition, we
prove that MSNE can not be invaded by a greedier strategy (i.e., mutant strategy).
5.3.3.1 Routing Game Structure
The evolutionary routing game is represented as G =< R,S,U >, whereR represents the
set of next hops available in the game; S = {sr|r ∈ R} is the strategy space, which is the set of
actions that are available for the players. The payoff for playing strategy sr and st is denoted by
u(sr, st) ∈ U when competing against each other. This happens when the player who is adopting
the strategy sr meets another player who is adopting the st strategy. In our game, the cost of
transmission is always preferred to be low, which will increase the payoff and prevent energy
wastage. Thus, we define the payoff as:
u(sr, st) =

( 1
Cυr
, 1
Cυt
) when r 6= t, υ ∈ {A,B}
(0, 0) when r = t
(5.4)
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where Cυr is the transmission cost of the packet through hop r, which either belongs to the popu-
lation A, or belongs to the population B. For example, CBr denotes the cost of selecting hop r by
the player, who belongs to population B.
Table 5.1: List of Notations and Acronyms
Notation Definition
NE Nash Equilibrium
ESS Evolutionary Stable Strategy
PSNE Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
MSNE Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
R Set of available hops in the game
S Strategy space, (set of actions that are available for the players (S = {sr|r ∈
R}))
U Set of hops’ utilities
sr Strategy of selecting hop r
ur Utility/payoff for selecting hop r.
u(sr, st) The utility/payoff for playing strategy sr and st when competing against each
other
si Strategy played by player i
s∗i Strategy of player i which is the best response to s
∗
i
s∗−i Best strategy played by player other than player i
υ ∈ {A,B} Population
Cυr Transmission cost of the packet through hop r
Cυt Transmission cost of the packet through hop t
Pˆ Probability distribution over set of of pure strategies for any player (collection
of wights in MSNE)
(p`, q`) Incumbent strategy/ESS probability distribution over set of hops (MSNE)
(pˆ, qˆ) A mutant strategy that is greedier than ESS
EUυ(sr) Expected Utility from selecting hop r
We define the routing game as a strategic matrix shown in Table 5.2 with a player set
composed of players that comprise υ = {A,B} populations. The payoff for players playing
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strategies sr and st, which are competing against each other, is denoted by u(sr, st). For the sake
of clarity in analysis and without loss any generality, we assume that ur > ut regarding the variety
of the available routes in the network, and transmitting the packet by using the strategy sr will cost
less than transmitting the packet by using strategy st according to the distance between the nodes.
Thus, it is preferable for all the nodes to forward the packets through hop r, which produces a high
payoff. In addition, transmitting the packet through the same hop (i.e., r or t) will cause a collision,
and hence, the payoff will be zero (see Eqn. 5.4).
In addition, we initially consider a 2-available hop game i.e., we show competition between
the two strategies sr and st as a demonstration to clarify and analyze the performance of the game
besides deriving its PSNE and MSNE. Later, we utilize the same technique in the case of multiple
hops, as will be presented in the experimental results in Chapter 7. The players in our game adopt
one of the two available hops (i.e., r or t). We analyze the payoff based on Table 5.2, and employ
the same game formulation to answer the fundamental questions as: 1) What does a strategy sr gain
as a payoff when it meets another same strategy sr or another different strategy st? 2) How does
the equilibrium solution make the player satisfy and respect the other’s choices? As we consider
the players in our game are to be rational, all players would maximize their payoff by minimizing
the cost of energy consumption and all players’ interest to not end up selecting the same strategy.
Table 5.2: Strategies Competition form of Evolutionary Routing Game (i.e., strategies sr and st)
sr st
sr 0 , 0 1CAr ,
1
CBt
st
1
CAt
, 1
CBr
0 , 0
5.3.3.2 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionary Stability for the Game
In this subsection, we derive the PSNE as first potential solutions for our evolutionary anti-
coordination routing game. Then, we analyze its evolutionary stability.
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5.3.3.2.1 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
According to definition 1, we prove that our evolutionary routing game has two pure Nash
Equilibrium strategies.
Definition 1: A Pure Nash Equilibrium [72] of the routing game is a strategy profile s∗ ∈ S
of actions, such that:
u(s∗i, s∗−i) ≥ u(si, s∗−i),∀i ∈ N (5.5)
In other words, the strategy s∗i, to be pure NE, must satisfy the above condition. This condition
means that no player i has an incentive to deviate to another strategy to gain a higher payoff than
the one who is playing s∗i, given that the other players’ strategies remain the same s∗−i.
Lemma 1: In the evolutionary routing congestion anti-coordination game, strategy pairs
(sr, st) and (st, sr) are pure strategy NE.
Proof. Suppose two nodes are picked randomly from two large populations of sensor nodes in the
network. These nodes are supposed to select one of the two strategies, each competes against the
other, in order to transmit the packet. In Table 5.2, assume the row and the column are the two
players from populations A and B, respectively. These players select strategy pairs (sr, st) and
(st, sr). The payoffs of the selection are 1CAr ,
1
CBt
and 1
CAt
, 1
CBr
, respectively. Let us say that the
players select strategy pairs (sr, sr) and (st, st) instead. Thus, the payoffs for those strategy pairs
will be zero. This means that the player who is playing strategy sr does not have an incentive to
change the strategy to st because of the penalty of reducing the payoff according to equation 5.4.
As a result, we can say that strategy pairs (sr, sr) and (st, st) are not profitable deviations. Accord-
ing to the PSNE definition 1, the strategy pairs (sr, st) and (st, sr) are a pure strategy NE for this
game.
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5.3.3.2.2 Evolutionary Stability of the Game’s PSNE
We examine the PSNE evolutionary stability of the routing game according to definition 2
as follows:
Definition 2: In a symmetric game, the strategy s is evolutionary stable ESS in pure strate-
gies if:
1. u(s, s) is NE; u(s, s) >u(s´, s) for all s´ and
2. if u(s, s) = u(s´, s), then u(s, s´) >u(s´, s´)
That means the players will play (s, s), which is a symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE). The sym-
metric Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium where all players use the identical strategy. Strategy s
is called evolutionary stable if a small group playing different strategy, mutant strategy s´, would
be less and less as time evolves. Eventually, it will not be played at all. The ESS [72] defined
above as any evolutionary stable strategy must be a symmetric pure NE, where the performance of
strategy s against itself performs better than against a mutant strategy. However, if the strategy is
not strictly Nash, it should satisfy the second condition of the evolutionary stability. The second
condition states that the incumbent s must do strictly better against the mutant s´ than a mutant
strategy does against another mutant strategy. Consider a group of two populations playing the
same strategy s, which is referred to as the incumbent strategy. In this game, the pure strategies
are not symmetric pure NE where the payoff of strategy sr is different from the payoff of strategy
st (i.e., u(s, s) < u(s´, s)). According to the definition 2 of ESS, the pure strategy NE in our game
is not evolutionary stable, and it is an impractical solution for the long term strategy of routes
selection in WSNs, where it is always unfair for the player that selects the higher cost of energy
consumption path.
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5.3.3.3 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionary Stability for the Game
In this subsection, we derive the MSNE as a second potential solution for our evolutionary
anti-coordination routing game, and we analyze its evolutionary stability.
5.3.3.3.1 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Definition 3: The Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium [77] of the routing game is a proba-
bility distribution Pˆ (collection of weights) over the set of pure strategies S for any player such
that:
Pˆ = (p1, p2, p3, ..., pr) ∈ RR ≥ 0, and
R∑
t=1
pt = 1 (5.6)
The pure strategy will be available with certain probabilities where the payoffs from all opponents
of their strategies are eventually equal. Thus, the expected payoffs given to strategies in a Mixed
Nash Equilibrium are equal.
In our game, let p` = {p, 1−p} denotes the proportions of the populationA adopting sr and
st strategies, respectively, and q` = {q, 1− q} denotes the proportion of the population B adopting
sr and st strategies, respectively. In a 2-hop scenario, player 1, who belongs to population A,
plays strategy sr with probability p and strategy st with 1 − p probability. Player 2, who belongs
to population B, plays strategy sr with probability q and strategy st with 1 − q probability. We
calculate those probabilities using the mixed strategy algorithm and the payoff in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Strategies Competition form of Evolutionary Routing Game with Probability Distribu-
tion pˆ over the Pure Strategies (i.e., strategies sr and st).
Prob.(sr) = p Prob.(st) = 1− p
Prob.(sr) = q 0 , 0 1CAr ,
1
CBt
Prob.(st) = 1− q 1CAt , 1CBr 0 , 0
According to Mixed Nash definition 3, the expected utility from playing strategy sr is equal
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to the expected utility for playing strategy st for any player as follows:
EUυ(sr) = EUυ(st), υ ∈ {A,B} (5.7)
The expected utility for playing strategy sr for the player who belongs toA population and
the player who belongs to population B, respectively, are:
EUA(sr) = q · 0 + (1− q) 1
CAr
(5.8)
EUB(sr) = p · 0 + (1− p) 1
CBr
(5.9)
The expected utilities for playing strategy st for the players in the two populations are:
EUA(st) = q
1
CAt
+ (1− q) · 0 (5.10)
EUB(st) = p
1
CBt
+ (1− p) · 0 (5.11)
Setting (5.8) and (5.10) equal as in (5.7), then solve it to find the probability distribution
p` = {p, 1 − p}. Similarly, setting (5.9) and (5.11) equal as in (5.7), then solve it to find the
probability distribution q` = {q, 1− q} such as:
p =
CAt
CAt + CAr
, 1− p = CAr
CAt + CAr
(5.12)
q =
CBt
CBt + CBr
, 1− q = CBr
CBt + CBr
(5.13)
The players from A and B populations adopt the strategy sr with probabilities (p, q), re-
spectively, and the strategy st with probabilities (1−p, 1−q), respectively. The players in the rout-
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ing game mix their selections of the next hop to transmit the data packet with (p, q) and (1−p, 1−q)
probabilities. In addition, none of the players would change the strategy with an expectation of
gaining a better payoff. The reason behind this behavior is that adopting the strategies in that
manner will represent the same outcome.
5.3.3.3.2 Analysis Evolutionary Stability of the Game’s MSNE
Previously, we proved that the game solution is a Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (p`, q`).
Here, we analyze the evolutionary stability of Mixed Strategy Nash Equlibrium (MSNE) (i.e.,
(p`, q`)) in our asymmetric routing game according to definition 4 of asymmetric evolutionary stable
strategy [78] such as:
Definition 4: Defines (p`, q`) as a two-species evolutionary stable strategy [78] if it is asymp-
totically stable under the two-dimensional equation whenever it is based on the strategy pair (p`, q`)
and (pˆ, qˆ), when (p`, q`) 6= (pˆ, qˆ).
In other words, the two-species ESS with strategy pair (p`, q`) cannot be invaded by a mutant
subsystem, which uses a different strategy pair (pˆ, qˆ).
Lemma 2: Our mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (p`, q`) is a two-species evolutionary stable
strategy.
Proof. First, we define the replicator equations, which are ruling the behavior of the system over
time [79], based on the strategy pair (p`, q`). In our routing game, we define the replicator equation
such that the fraction of strategy sr grows at a rate equal to its fitness minus the average fitness of
the player. We have the following replicator equations:
p˙ = p[(
1− q
CAr
)− (p(1− q)
CAr
+
(1− p)q
CAt
)]
= p(1− p)(1− q
CAr
− q
CAt
)
(5.14)
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q˙ = q[(
1− p
CBr
)− (q(1− p)
CBr
+
(1− q)p
CBt
)]
= q(1− q)(1− p
CBr
− p
CBt
)
(5.15)
Second, we need to find the stable fixed point for the two replicator equations. We have the MSNE
point, which we calculated in 5.3.3.3.1. We proved how this point is a fixed point under the two
replicator equations (5.14) and (5.15).
Since we already have a stable point (p`, q`) in our model, we need to show that the point is
fixed under the replicator equations. Therefore, we need to satisfy that the last part (i.e., ( 1−q
CAr
− q
CAt
)
and ( 1−p
CBr
− p
CBt
)) in equations (5.14) and (5.15), respectively, should equal zero. Therefore, if
we substitute the values of p and q from equations (5.12) and (5.13) with these last parts, we
will get zero. As a result, (p`, q`) is a asymptotically stable fixed point for the replicator dynamic.
Based on asymmetric ESS [78], our mixed strategy NE (p`, q`) is a two-species evolutionary stable
strategy.
5.3.3.3.3 Numerical Analysis of Evolutionary Stability for the Game’s MSNE
For the sake of certainty, we will analyze the ESS for the proposed MSNE solution by
satisfying the condition of the following theorem [78] numerically in this part.
Theorem[78]: (p`, q`) is a two-species ESS if and only if
either p` · (Dpˆ+ Eqˆ) > pˆ · (Dpˆ+ Eqˆ)
or q` · (F pˆ+Gqˆ) > qˆ · (F pˆ+Gqˆ)
for all strategy pairs (pˆ, qˆ) that are sufficiently close (not equal) to (p`, q`). D, E, F , and G
are the payoff matrices for interspecies interaction.
In our routing game, suppose two sensor nodes are picked randomly from two population
(i.e., A and B), and these nodes are supposed to select one of the two strategies (i.e., sr and st),
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which compete against each other in order to transmit the data packet. Assume that we have the
payoff matrix values for Table 5.2 as: CAt = 4, CAr = 2, CBt = 8, and CBr = 6. Based on those
values, we calculate the MSNE and the rest of the elements as: (p`, q`) =
47 23
3
7
1
3
, D =
0 12
1
4
0
,
and E =
0 16
1
8
0
. D and E are the payoff matrices for interspecies interactions. It is supposed
that there are small groups adopting a mutant strategy (pˆ, qˆ) instead, which is greedier than the
incumbent strategy (p`, q`). Furthermore, it is assumed that the mutant strategy selects the near hop
r with higher probability (i.e., p + δ, q + δ) and selects the farther hop t with lower probability
(i.e.,(1 − p) − δ, (1 − q) − δ), where δ is a small positive number (i.e., δ = 0.1). Thus, (pˆ, qˆ) = 47 + δ 23 + δ
3
7
− δ 1
3
− δ
. Then, by substituting those values in the first condition of the theorem [78], we
have p`.(Dpˆ + Eqˆ) > pˆ.(Dpˆ + Eqˆ) (i.e., 0.23 > 0.22). Accordingly, (p`, q`) cannot be invaded by
the greedier mutation and is ESS.
5.3.3.4 R-Hop Scenario and Replicator Dynamics
In this subsection, we provide a dynamic way to achieve the equilibria and extend our anal-
ysis to the R-Hop scenario for our evolutionary routing game according to the concept of replicator
dynamics. We introduce the replicator dynamic model in order to show how the players, who re-
peatedly play the routing game, evolve their behavior in every stage of the game. The populations
learn with each strategy’s interaction until they reach a stable state. Replicator dynamics describe
the populations’ behavior of sharing associated with different strategies, that evolve over time [79].
In the following equations, we derive the replicator dynamics of our routing game framework with
r hops.
In the following, we introduce fitness defined by our replicator dynamic equations. From
the above sections 5.3.3.3, let’s consider two populations of interacting nodes. Each time nodes
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from one population (row players A) are randomly paired with nodes from the other population
(column players B). All players have a set of hops R, and strategy sr ∈ S are adopted. Let
p` = {p1, p2, p3, ..., pr} and q` = {q1, q2, q3, ..., qr} denote the proportion of the two-population
adopting s1, s2, s3, ..., sr strategies, respectively, where summation of the proportions equals to 1
(i.e.,
r∑
i=1
pi = 1 and
r∑
i=1
qi = 1 ) as described in section 5.3.3.3. Let (p`, q`) represent the incumbent
strategy of selecting hop r with probability pr,qr. In addition, let the set of U = {u1, u2, u3, ...ur}
represent the average payoff of the players selecting hop r at a given stage of our game. Fur-
thermore, let ur denote the utility function of adopting strategy sr. The payoff of selecting hop r
strategy sr for row player (A) is given by:
ur = u0 +
|R|∑
t=1
qru(sr, st), ∀r, t ∈ R (5.16)
The payoff of selecting hop r strategy sr for column player (B) is given by:
ur = u0 +
|R|∑
t=1
pru(sr, st), ∀r, t ∈ R (5.17)
where u0 is the initial fitness of every player, and u(sr, st) is the fitness of selecting hop r in
pairwise competition against adopting hop t.
Let uA and uB denote the average fitness for entire populationA, and B, respectively, which
are given by:
uA =
r∑
y=1
py(qyuy), ∀y ∈ R (5.18)
uB =
r∑
y=1
qy(pyuy), ∀y ∈ R (5.19)
For each next time slot, the probability (pˇr, qˇr), of selecting next hop r of the game is
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calculated by:
pˇr = pr +
qr(ur − uB)
uB
(5.20)
qˇr = qr +
pr(ur − uA)
uA
(5.21)
Algorithm 5.1: Replicator dynamics
Results: Converge the startegy of selection hops to ESS;
Initialization: Set the available hops R and their related utilities
(payoffs) U, intial fitness u0, population distribution pr and qr, hop
utilities ur ;
begin
for evrey time slot of the game do
At current time caculate:
1. average payoff of selecting hop r for sensors
population (i.e.,A and B) at current time
(equations (5.16-5.17))
2. Calculate average fitness u for entire sensor
nodes population (equations (5.18-5.19))
Caclulate hop selection startegies for next time slot (equations
(5.20-5.21)) ;
end
end
The proportion of sensors selecting hop r in the next time slot will be either increased or
decreased according to the comparison of the average fitness of selecting that hop to the overall
fitness of the entire sensor population in the current time slot. According to our evolutionary
replicator equations, the next particular hop will be selected more frequently in a subsequent time
slot if the payoff of selecting that hop is higher than the average overall fitness of the entire sensor
network. Algorithm 5.1 shows the summary of the proposed replicator dynamics algorithm. The
time complexity of the proposed algorithm is O(n).
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5.3.3.5 Fairness Analysis
Fairness is an important performance criteria in routing protocols for resource sharing.
Janin’s fairness index [80] is one of the efficient measurements to determine the fair share of
the system’s resources. In our proposed game, we analyze the fairness of both pure and mixed
solutions of the Nash Equilibria, and consider the case of 2-hop scenario of the routing sharing
game for the sake of clarity. Furthermore, the same concept will be applied in the case of R-hop
scenario. Measuring of the fairness of the derived Nash equlibria, and the guaranteeing of the
provision of the same utilities to all users, is achieved by following Jain’s equation:
J (u1, u2, u3, ..., uN) = (
∑N
i=1 ui)
2
N ·∑Ni=1 ui2 (5.22)
where N is the number of sensor nodes and the utility of allocating the hops is given by ui. The
index of the equation are bounded between 0 (worst case and totally unfair system) and 1 (best
case and perfectly fair system). We analyze the fairness of the solutions of the game as follows:
1. As we proved earlier that the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) for the evolutionary
routing anti-coordination game is the pair of strategy (sr, st) and (st, sr). According to our
previously named assumption for 2-hop scenario, transmitting the packet through hop r will
provide a higher payoff than transmitting the packet through hop t. This means that ur 6= ut
and the distribution of payoffs for the ratio in equation (5.22) are unequal and less than 1.
Also, one player in the game always gets a smaller payoff than the other. Thus, PSNE is not
a fair solution because it does not result in equal payoff for all nodes.
2. Another finding for the game is that a Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) is the
probability distribution p`, q` (collection of weights) computed by equations (5.12) and (5.13).
Based on definition 3 of MSNE, the expected utility of the strategies for all players are equal
even though the costs of transmitting the packet through the hops are different, and that
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makes the opponents indifferent about their choice of strategy. Having equal payoffs ui will
maximize the value of the equation (5.22) which equals 1. As a result, the MSNE’s resource
distribution is fair.
5.4 A Game Theoretic Approach for Energy-Efficient Clustering Algorithm in Sensor Networks
One of the important issue in WSNs is selection of clusterheads using energy efficient
clustering algorithm. In this section of the chapter, we take a game theoretic approach to devise
a clustering algorithm for WSNs. Analyzing and predicting the rational and selfish behaviors of
various entities– the decisions of which determine the outcome of the game using game theory that
have been applied to numerous areas of wireless communications [19], a powerful mathematical
tool.
The rest of the section is organized as follows: We highlights the motivation for the idea in
section 5.4.1. The network model is presented in Section 5.4.2. The clustering game is presented
in Section 5.4.3. We propose the clustering technique in Section 5.4.4.
5.4.1 Motivation for the Proposed Idea
In our approach, the nodes are the players who play the clustering game. We propose a
Cost and Payment-based clustering Algorithm (CoPA) that formalizes the profits and losses for
each node. In order to balance the energy consumption, the CoPA alternates the responsibility of a
clusterhead among the nodes, and it uses a weighted metric that combines the transmission power
and energy of each node. We formulate an anti-coordination clustering game for 2 players as well
as N players using only local information. The Correlated Equilibrium (CE) for the clustering
game is derived by solving the linear optimization, and the adaptive regret matching (no-regret) al-
gorithm is utilized to guarantee convergence of the probability distribution to the CE. Furthermore,
in terms of the efficiency and fairness among the nodes, we prove and discuss the optimality of a
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CE solution for the clustering game, and compare it to the pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equi-
librium (MSNE) solutions. Finally, we demonstrate that the CoPA has superior performance in
terms of network lifetime and system throughput by evaluating the performance of our clustering
algorithm using two popular clustering techniques.
5.4.2 Network Model
We consider a network with N sensor nodes represented by the set N = {1, 2, 3, ..n},
and divide the entire network into non-overlapping clusters. Each cluster has one clusterhead that
receives/transmits data packets from its cluster members and also communicates with the base
station in order to deliver those data packets. Furthermore, we consider that the base station is
located outside the sensing field. Apart from the communications, the clusterhead has additional
responsibilities compared with the cluster members, which include aggregating (i.e., multiplex-
ing and demultiplexing) the data of its members, packet forwarding, and sometimes scheduling.
Therefore, the energy consumption rate of a clusterhead is significantly higher than the energy
consumption rate of a cluster member. This leads to the situation where each node prefers not to
be a clusterhead as long as there are other nodes willing to serve as clusterheads. In case all the
nodes decide to be cluster members (i.e., no clusterheads), then the data of all cluster members
cannot be relayed to the BS, resulting significant data loss to the sensor network. Thus, to keep
the network operating in a fair manner [81], the nodes must find a way to efficiently rotate their
roles between clusterheads and cluster members. Following, we use a game theoretical approach
to present a Cost and Payment-based clustering Algorithm (CoPA).
5.4.3 Clustering Game
Let us formally define the game and the cost functions of the nodes. Then we will analyze
the equilibria and the no-regret learning for the correlated equilibria.
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5.4.3.1 Game Framework
We formulate an anti-coordination N−player and 2− strategy symmetric game. The game
is presented as G =< N ,S,U >. The players are represented by N ; each player has the same
action/strategy space represented by S, and their utility is given by U .
The set of strategies available to a sensor node is to decide between being a clusterhead
(CH) or a cluster member (CM), and is represented as S = {CH,CM}. The structure of network
is described as a cost and payment model: the nodes gain a specific payoff when they select one
of these strategies. Each node behaves selfishly in order to maximize its own payoff (minimize
the cost) and stay alive as long as possible. A player may choose to serve as the clusterhead and
carry out the additional responsibilities for its members, or refuse to be a clusterhead (e.g., prefer
to be a cluster member) in order to maximize its payoff. If more than one player in close physical
proximity opt to become a clusterhead, then smaller clusters emerge. As a result, unnecessary
control overhead and power consumption would be incurred. However, if none of the nodes opt to
be a clusterhead, all the nodes will suffer and all will obtain a payoff of 0 as the nodes will not be
able to send their data to the base station.
The set of utility functions of the nodes denoted by U(si), is given by:
U(si) =

0 when si = CM,∀i ∈ N
1
Cch
when si = CH
1
Ccm
when si = CM
(5.23)
where Cch represents the cost of being a clusterhead, and Ccm represents the cost of being
a cluster member. For the sake of simplicity, let us first provide the possible equilibria in the case
of 2 players and their payoffs as presented in Table 5.4. Based on this payoff matrix, the best
outcome occurs when one of the nodes selects to be a clusterhead and the other selects to be a
cluster member.
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Table 5.4: Strategic form of 2-player clustering game with strategies CH and CM .
CH CM
CH 1
Cch
, 1
Cch
1
Cch
, 1
Ccm
CM 1
Ccm
, 1
Cch
0 , 0
5.4.3.2 Cost Model
The total cost of being a clusterhead, Cch, consists of two parts: i) the energy spent to trans-
mit packets to the base station and ii) the energy consumed for aggregating the packets received
from the cluster members. Thus,
Cch = Ctx(ch,BS) + Crx,aggr (5.24)
where Ctx(ch,BS) is the cost of transmission from the clusterhead to the base station, and Crx,aggr is
the cost of receiving and aggregating the packets from the cluster members. We define Ctx(ch,BS)
as:
Ctx(ch,BS) = d
2
ch,BS · eamp + eelec (5.25)
where dch,BS is the distance between the clusterhead and the base station, eamp the transmit ampli-
fier dissipation in order to achieve the required signal level, and eelec is the transmission circuitry
dissipation.
As for the cost of receiving and aggregating data from cluster members, it is proportional
to the cluster size (i.e., k¯ average number of neighbors), i.e.,Crx,aggr ∝ k¯.
It is to be noted that the cluster members will be at varying distances from the clusterhead
and therefore the clusterhead uses different power levels to transmit to its members. (We assume
that there is some power control algorithm is place– the specifics of which is beyond the scope of
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this chapter.) Thus,
Crx,aggr =
k¯∑
i=1
d2i · eelec + k¯ · eaggr + elis (5.26)
where di is the distance of the ith cluster member from its clusterhead and eaggr is the cost of
aggregation for one cluster member. elis is the cost of listening to the wireless medium even
though no packets are being to transmitted.
The cost of i-th node being a cluster member is the cost of transmission from this node to
its clusterhead chi considering the distance (di,chi) is calculated by:
Ccm = Ctx(i,chi) = eamp.d
2
i,chi
+ eelec (5.27)
According to above mentioned energy model and assuming the base station is located outside the
sensing region, the cost of being a clusterhead is expected to be larger than the cost of being a
cluster member, i.e.,
Cch > Ccm (5.28)
5.4.3.3 Analysis and Equilibrium
5.4.3.3.1 Pure and Mixed Nash Equilibrium
For the clustering game, we derive the solution concepts in the form of Pure and Mixed
Nash Equilibrium for 2-players and N -players.
Lemma 1: Strategy pairs (CH,CM) and (CM,CH) are pure strategy NE for 2-player
clustering game.
Proof. In Table 5.4, assume the row and the column are the two players from the cluster. If
these players select strategy pairs (CH,CM) and (CM,CH), the payoffs of the selection will
be ( 1
Cch
, 1
Ccm
) and ( 1
Ccm
, 1
Cch
), respectively. On the other hand, if these players select strategy
pairs (CH,CH) and (CM,CM) instead, the payoffs will be ( 1
Cch
, 1
Cch
) and zero, respectively.
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This means that the player who is playing strategy CH does not have an incentive to change the
strategy to CM because of receiving less payoffs (i.e., zero). Furthermore, the player who is
playing strategy CM does not have an incentive to change the strategy to CH because of receiving
less payoffs too (i.e., 1
Cch
). Thus, the strategy pairs (CH,CM) and (CM,CH) are a pure NE for
this game according to the definition [72].
Proposition 1: For the anti-coordination clustering game for N players, there are N pure NE
where the strategy of a single player is to select CH and all the rest of the nodes are to select CM .
The mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of the clustering game is a probability distribution pˆ
over the pure NE where each player will have equal expected payoff. Each node will take a random
selection conformity with the probability distribution. Let α be the probability of playing CH and
β = 1−α be the probability of playing CM . In order to compute these probabilities, we calculate
the expected utility function of playing CH as:
EUCH =
1
Cch
(5.29)
The expected utility of playing CM is obtained by:
EUCM =
1
Ccm
· [1− (1− α)N−1] (5.30)
According to the definition of mixed NE [77], the expected utilities of playing strategies
CH and CM are equal and no player has incentive to change her strategy. Thus,
EUCH = EUCM (5.31)
Substituting (5.29) and (5.30) in (5.31) and solving the expression in order to calculate the proba-
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bility α that corresponds to the equilibrium, we get:
α = 1− (Cch − Ccm
Cch
)
1
N−1 (5.32)
The distribution of the mixed strategy NE for the clustering game is pˆ = {α, β} which
means that the players will mix their choice for selecting clusterhead strategy and cluster member
without incurious about the outcome. However, MSNE is not efficient enough where we could end
up with (CH,CH) or (CM,CM) strategies, which is not desirable for the system and could lead
to performance degradation of the network.
5.4.3.3.2 Correlated Equilibrium (CE)
We propose a new solution concept, Correlated Equilibrium, for the clustering game that
maximizes the outcome and prevents undesirable action. The correlated equilibrium concept is
more general than NE and was first proposed by Nobel Laureate Robbert J. Aummann [82].
Thus far, the players’ strategies are independent where each player chooses her mixed
strategy independently without any communication with each other. According to MSNE solution,
all players will gain equal payoffs. However, if the players can avoid ending up with the same
strategies by following an agreement/external signal for the coordination of actions between the
nodes, the outcome will be maximized, and efficiency of the system will be higher. The strategy
profile is selection according to joint distribution. This results distribution strategy profile called
Correlate Equilibrium, where it is best interest for each player to follow the external signal and
conform with the recommended strategy. Thereby, the players have no incentive to deviate to gain
higher payoff.
The essence of a correlated equilibrium [72] is that when all players follow the external
recommendation signal, no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate from the trusted authority’s
recommendation to achieve higher payoff. Moreover, that signal could be generated by an arbitra-
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tor which is seen as a virtual entity and does not depend on the system. The correlated equilibrium
is defined as:
Definition of correlated equilibrium [72]: A probability distribution pi is a correlated
equilibrium of the game G if and only if, for all i ∈ N , si ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i:
∑
s−i∈S−i
pi(si, s−i)[ui(s′i, s−i)− ui(si, s−i)] ≤ 0 (5.33)
where pi(si, s−i) denotes the joint probability distribution of players. The action for user i and its
opponents are si and s−i. The inequality (5.33) implies that the expected payoff of player i playing
the recommendation strategy si at the CE is greater than or equal to the expected payoff that could
be received for choosing any other strategy s′i. In other words, choosing action s
′
i instead of si
cannot obtain a higher expected payoff for user i.
5.4.3.3.3 Linear Programming Solution
For the proposed game, we investigate a linear optimization method to calculate the opti-
mal CE [72],[77],[82]. We drive the CE linear system for 2-player game as shown in Table 5.4,
then we implement the same mechanism for N players. A correlated strategy pair in the game
is given by the CE joint probability distribution, which is represented as a 4-dimensional vector
pi = (p1, p2, p3, p4), where p1 +p2 +p3 +p4 = 1. A correlated strategy pair means that the strategy
pair (CH,CH) is played with probability p1, strategy pair (CH,CM) is played with probability
p2, strategy pair (CM,CH) is played with probability p3, and strategy pair (CM,CM) is played
with probability p4.
In order to find the egalitarian equilibrium for the game, we formulate the game as linear
programming and define the objective function f to find the optimal strategy CE as:
f = max
p
∑
i∈N
Ep(ui) (5.34)
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such that

∀si, s′i ∈ Si, and, i ∈ N,
p(si, s−i)[ui(s′i, s−i)− ui(si, s−i)] ≤ 0
where Ep(.) is the expectation over p. Then, the constrains for CE for 2-player game are:
u1(CH,CH)p1 + u1(CH,CM)p2 ≥ u1(CH,CH)p1 + u1(CM,CM)p2 (5.35)
u1(CM,CH)p3 + u1(CM,CM)p4 ≥ u1(CH,CH)p3 + u1(CH,CM)p4 (5.36)
u2(CH,CH)p1 + u2(CM,CH)p3 ≥ u2(CH,CM)p1 + u2(CM,CM)p3 (5.37)
u2(CH,CM)p2 + u2(CM,CH)p4 ≥ u2(CH,CH)p1 + u2(CM,CH)p4 (5.38)
By solving the above inequalities, the obvious solution for the CE probability distribution
is: p1 = p4 = 0 and p2 = p3 which maximizes the sum of the expected payoffs for all players.
Thus, the CE joint probability distribution pi = (0, p, 1 − p, 0). Thereby, we have eliminated the
possibility of selecting the same strategy for the players.
For N -player and 2-strategies clustering game, we can derive the linear system and CE
constrains according to (5.34) in the same manner for obtaining polynomial time algorithms for
optimizing over CE. The number of inequality constraints grow exponentially with the number of
players [83]. This result proves that following the external signal is self-enforcing, since coopera-
tion arises naturally from the rules of the game. In addition, it must be considered that the external
signal is not binding and players can ignore it. Thus, we guarantee the convergence of equilibrium
to CE by utilizing the no-regret learning algorithm discussed in section 5.4.3.5.
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5.4.3.4 Fairness and Efficiency (Pareto Optimality)
In this section, we will discuss the fairness and efficiency of all the proposed solution game
(i.e., pure and mixed strategy NE compared with CE), as well as evaluate the proposed CE solution
by using a concrete example and applying the Pareto optimality concept. Pareto Optimality is the
objective measurement of efficiency in game theory.
Table 5.5: An Example of Payoffs Matrix for 2-player
CH CM
CH 1
6
, 1
6
1
6
, 1
2
CM 1
2
, 1
6
0 , 0
The two pure strategy NE in the clustering game (i.e., (CH,CM) and (CM,CH)) are
unfair where one node always gets higher payoff than the other. However, the MSNE for the game
achieves the fairness where the expected utility of the players are equal.
For sake of clarity, let us assume the example of payoffs matrix for 2-players as shown in
Table 5.5. The MSNE for the clustering game is the distribution (α = 1/3, β = 2/3) over the set of
pure strategies. The expected utility for both players will be equal when they mix their strategies
according to MSNE. As per equations (5.29)-(5.32), the expected utility is 0.16. Additionally,
the chance of none of the players being a clusterhead (2/3 × 2/3 = 44.4%), and the chance
of ending up with more than one clusterhead at the same time is (1/3 × 1/3 = 11.1%). This
means that there is always a high chance of an undesirable action occurring with MSNE (i.e.,
55%) either for lossing communication with the base station in the case of absence the clusterhead,
or energy wastage in case of more than one clusterhead in the cluster. Accordingly, the MSNE
is an inefficient equilibrium to the game. In the same manner, the joint probability distribution of
CE for the game shown in Table 5.5 is (pi = {0, 1/2, 1/2, 0}) which is calculated by the linear
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programming (5.34-5.38). The expected utility for the players is 1/2× (1/6 + 1/2) = 0.33, which
is greater than the expected utility of MSNE as well as the payoffs of always be a clusterhead.
Figure 5.1: Geometrical representation of the set of attainable payoffs under CE for Table 5.5 .
Furthermore, another way to prove the efficiency of the CE is to analyze the Pareto opti-
mality of the solution. The main idea of Pareto optimality is to maximize the outcome of the game
where no player can be better off without making some other players worse off. In other words,
an outcome of the game is Pareto efficient if there is no other outcome where a player’s utility can
be increased without making some other player’s utility worse [84]. Figure 5.1 is the convex hull
graphical presentation of the game considered in Table 5.5. The 4 points in the figure represent all
four possible payoffs. The maximum payoffs attainable by a node must occur at one of the vectors
of the convex hull (i.e., (CH,CM) and (CM,CH)), which are the pure Nash equilibria. It can be
noticed that the set of Pareto optimal solution is the line between these two payoff vectors, whereas
a mixed between these two vectors of expected payoffs is the proposed CE solution for the game.
Therefore, the CE is Pareto optimal (i.e., efficient) solution, where it maximizes the ex-
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pected utility besides achieving fairness. Moreover, it must be noticed that the CE is less expensive
than NE computationally, where computing CE only requires solving a linear program. In contrast,
NE requires finding its fixed point completely to solve it.
5.4.3.5 No-Regret Learning Algorithm for CE N-player game
We provide how the strategies of the players reach an equilibrium without needing the trust
arbitrators, where the recommended signal is not binding and the players are free to ignore it. In
order for the convergence to occur to the set of correlated equilibria in the long run, we use the
learning process called regret matching (no-regret) algorithm [85]. The goal of the algorithm is
to minimize the regret of each player and reach 0 as time t → ∞. Adjustment of the probability
distribution is guided by the average difference (i.e., regret measures) based on the history of the
actions that have been played by all players from past periods.
In particular, assume that the game is played repeatedly through time t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, ....T},
and player i selects the distribution (pt)i over action S. Each player in each period decides either
to continue playing the same probability distribution (pt)i for the next time tick (t + 1) or switch
to other probabilities (p′t)i that are proportional to the difference “regrets” relative to the current
probability. Precisely, for any two distinct actions s, s′ ∈ Si of player i selecting according to a
probability distribution pit(s) and p
i
t(s
′), respectively, the regret of the player i at time T for not
playing s′i is calculated as:
Rit(si, s
′
i) = max{Dit(si, s′i), 0} (5.39)
where the average difference is given by:
Dit(si, s
′
i) =
1
t
t∑
τ=1
[ui(s
′
i, s
−i
τ )− ui(sτ )] (5.40)
For the next period (t+ 1), the probabilities pit+1(si) and p
i
t+1(s
′
i) for player i to take action
70
si and s′i, respectively, are computed as:
pit+1(s
′
i) =
1
µ
Rit(si, s
′
i),
pit+1(si) = 1− pit+1(s′i).
(5.41)
where the probability pit+1(si) is a linear function of regret, and µ is an independent parameter of
time and history, and is sufficiently large. Choice of µ > 2M i guarantees that the probability of
playing the same strategy as in the last period is positive, where M i is an upper bound on |ui(.)|.
In each period, the player selects an action and observes the loss/gain to adjust the probability of
choosing an alternative action for higher payoff until the strategies converge to CE. Algorithm 5.2
shows the summary of no-regret learning algorithm.
5.4.4 Strategy Space Reduction for CoPA
Though all the nodes in the network should contribute to the network by serving as clus-
terhead from time to time, there would always be some nodes that are less suitable to take on the
added responsibility. At any point of time, there would be better suited nodes and ‘weaker’ nodes.
The weaker nodes might have less energy remaining, lower transmission capabilities, or lower
computing power. Therefore, instead of having all nodes participate in the game and exploring the
entire strategy space for finding the equilibrium solution, we argue that certain weaker nodes can
safely be excluded for clusterhead consideration.
In order to select the group of nodes that will contribute into the game at any time instance,
we consider two system parameters– transmission energy consumption and residual energy, and
combine them using a weighed average. If ωn represents the weighted average of node n, then
ωn = w1Dn + w2En (5.42)
whereDn is the summation of the distances of all neighbours of node n (i.e.,Dn =
∑
n∈N
{dist(n, n′)}),
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and En denotes how much energy the node consumed until the current time. w1 and w2 are the
weighting factors.
Algorithm 5.2: Regret-matching (no-regret) learning algorithm
Initialization: Set the probability for taking action si, ∀s ∈ Si for the
node i arbitrarily, pit=1(si);
begin
for t = 1, 2, 3, 4... do
for each node i do
Calculate payoff uit for playing with probability p
i
t(si);
Find the regret Rit(si, s
′
i) of the player i for not playing s
′
i up
to time t (equations (5.39-5.40));
Find the probability distribution action for t+ 1 (equation
(5.41)) as;
1. Update pit+1(si) to take action si
2. Calculate pit+1(s
′
i) to take action s
′
i
end
end
end
Based on ωn, it is relatively easy to categorize a node as ‘suitable’ or ‘unsuitable’ just by
comparing ωn to some threshold value. As for determining the threshold, a simple way would
be to use some local cluster parameters, like the mean of the weighted average of all the nodes.
Additionally, the threshold is updated periodically and sent to all cluster members by the same
arbitrator (i.e., virtual entity) responsible for generating the external signal for CE solution.
The suitable nodes participate in the repeated clustering game by playing the game in
rounds. After each round, all nodes update ωn and compare with the new threshold for the next
round. This exclusion policy has two main features: i) the weighted metric is generic enough and
can accommodate any number of node parameters, ii) prohibits unsuitable nodes to participate in
the game, thereby reducing the strategy space and speeding up the equilibrium convergence.
72
5.5 Summary
Designing routing and clustering algorithms that alleviate congestion, and constitute a high
energy efficient clustering technique in WSNs is a challenging problem. Absence of a centralized
mechanism to select among available paths unavoidably introduces extra collisions, resulting in
reduction of the sensor network lifetime. This chapter analyzes the congestion routing issue in
WSNs to seek equilibrium solutions and that utilize an evolutionary game theoretical framework.
The proposed approach enables independent sensor nodes to evolve a strategy that ensures long-
term in distributed manner.
Furthermore, we proposed a cost and payment clustering techniques (CoPA) for WSNs.
CoPA determines the cost of being a clusterhead or a cluster member and provides the probability
distribution for the correlated equilibrium. We also proposed a flexible weighted function in order
to determine a node’s eligibility to participate in the clustering game. In addition, we proved
that the correlated equilibrium achieves better performance than the pure and mixed strategy Nash
Equlibria in term of efficiency and fairness.
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CHAPTER 6: A GAME THEPRITIC AOOROACH FOR ATTACKS AND
DEFENSE STARTEGIES
6.1 Overview
Most of the network security research focus on either presenting a specific vulnerability
or hacking technique, or proposing a specific defense algorithm to defend against a well-defined
attack scheme. Although such wireless sensor network security research is important, few have
paid attention to the dynamic interactions between attackers and defenders, where both sides are
intelligent and will dynamically change their attack or defense strategies in order to gain an advan-
tage over their opponents. A secure and trustworthy network system that considers the limitation
of the resources is significantly important in WSNs design, where some information is highly sen-
sitive. Therefore, a good defense system design must integrate security features along with the
computational aspects. Moreover, it must also consider the resource constraints of networks such
that the network is not over-burdened.
In this chapter, we design a network-warfare framework, rooted in game theory, which
involves a dynamic interaction between attackers and defenders. A novel approach for designing a
defense mechanism against several types of attacks/threats on WSNs is proposed– a hyper defense
approach that considers the limitation of resources as well as the security value in the network.
In addition, we attain optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker, considering that
they can dynamically choose their strategies in order to maximize their own payoff based on cost
minimization. Generally speaking, we classify the actions of either attacking or defending into
three categories: Level Zero, Level One, and Level Two. The attacker can alternate between these
three strategies, where Level Zero represents no attack, Level One represents a low intensity of
attack, and Level Two represents a high intensity attack. Likewise, we classify the defenders
actions into three corresponding defense levels. For Level Zero, the defender decides to not defend
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at all. The second one is a low level of defense, which can cost some of the resources (i.e.,
energy, or memory space, etc.). The third one is a high level of defense, which requires more
computational, battery power, or memory, but offers strong countermeasures against the threats.
In practice, the strategies of attackers and defenders for any network security problems could be
categorized into more fine-grained levels, but for the sake of clarity and modeling purposes, we
believe such a three-level classification of attack or defense is generalized enough and can well
represent attack and defense activities in real practice. We emphasize the often-neglected research
of the dynamic interactions and evolution among network security attackers and defenders. We
present a non-cooperative zero-sum game in modeling the network-warfare between attackers and
defenders based on the generalized three-level attack/defense strategies game. We present a case
study of three different types of WSNs attacks to demonstrate how the proposed game theoretic
framework can be applied in a broad range of network security problems.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: Non-cooperative attack-defense security
game is proposed in Section 6.2. We propose various case studies of the attack-defense security
game in Section 6.3. Summaries are drawn in the last section 6.4.
6.2 Non-Cooperative Attack-Defense Security Game
This section discusses how an attacker-defender security game is formulated as a non-
cooperative zero-sum game. In addition, we describe attacker and defender strategies and derive
their solutions. Being rational players in the game, an attacker competes for the best action and his
objective is to maximize his own utility. Therefore, the opponents are not bound to cooperate with
each other where the malicious attacker would want to play a suitable strategy to maximize his
chances of being successful and waste the resources of the system. In contrast, the defender would
also like to play a suitable strategy to maximize his chances of protection against the opponents
without overspending energy or computation on defending.
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As discussed in the literature review, most previous game theory research [59] [6] [61]
model attackers and defenders with only two strategies, no attack/defense, or with attack/defense.
In order to provide a broader modeling of attackers/defenders where they can adjust their attack-
/defense strategies with different intensities, in this chapter, we model each player with three levels
of strategies: no attack/defense, low level of intensity, and high level of intensity.
Attackers and defenders experience different cost to benefit affects in order to achieve their
success in either attack or defense. Therefore, in our game, each attacker and defender have dif-
ferent levels of strategies instead of having just two levels, as suggested by most of the previous
research. In our model, each of the players adopts zero level of intensity, low level of intensity, or
high level of intensity.
6.2.1 Game Model
We consider a two-player non-coordination zero-sum security game represented by G =<
(N ), (S), (U) >, where N = {A,D} represents the two players: Player A is a malicious-
node/attacker and the other player D is a defender. S = {ar, dr|r ∈ {0, 1, 2}} is the strategy
space, which is the set of actions that are available for each player, and their utilities are given by
U .
As we mentioned above, the attacker and the defender can use one of the three levels of
the available strategies during the game. For the attacker, level zero means that he decides not to
attack, denoted by a0 =No-Attack, level one is low intensity of attack, denoted by a1 =Attack-1;
and level two is a high intensity of attack, denoted by a2 =Attack-2. Generally speaking, from the
attacker’s perspective, compared with the strategy Attack-1, the strategy Attack-2 is more effective
in generating successful attack, but takes more resources or cost more for the attacker to implement.
Correspondingly, level zero for the defender means that he decides not to implement any defense,
denoted by d0 =No-Defend; level one is a low intensity of defense, denoted by d1 =Defend-1; and
level two is a high intensity of defense, denoted by d2 =Defend-2.
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Therefore, the attacker A has three strategies: a0=No-Attack, a1=Attack-1, and a2=Attack-
2. The defender D has three strategies as well: d0=No-Defend, d1=Defend-1, and d2=Defend-2.
Both players choose their strategies simultaneously without any collaboration, assuming common
knowledge about the game (i.e., U)/(gain and lost).
We assume that the value of the protected assets by the defender D is worth of ωn, where
ωn > 0 and n ∈ {1, 2}. ω1 is the value of assets compromised by Attack-1 strategy deployed by
the attacker successfully; ω2 is the value of assets compromised by Attack-2 strategy deployed by
the attacker successfully. According to zero-sum game, we assume that the gain of one player is
equal to the loss of the opponent. Therefore, ωn is the gain by the attacker if his strategy Attack-n
is successful and −ωn denotes the loss/damage by the defender. The value of this loss by defender
refers to the degree/amount of damage such as, wasting energy, number of compromised/disabled
nodes, loss of data integrity, etc.
Meanwhile, the attacker/defender also needs to make some effort (i.e., pay certain cost)
to implement their attack/defense strategies. For the attacker, we denote the cost of attack as can
where n ∈ {1, 2}: ca1 is the cost to deploy Attack-1 strategy, and ca2 is the cost to deploy Attack-2
strategy. Likewise, for the defender, we denote the cost of defense as cdn where n ∈ {1, 2}: cd1 is
the cost to deploy Defend-1 strategy, and cd2 is the cost to deploy Defend-2 strategy.
6.2.2 Model Assumptions
We make the following assumptions for our proposed three-level attack/defense strategy
model:
• Value of security assets is always greater than the cost to defend or attack against them
since otherwise the defender or the attacker does not have any incentive to defend or attack,
respectively; i.e, ωn > can, cdn, n ∈ {1, 2}.
• Cost of attack strategy a1=Attack-1 is less than the cost of attack strategy a2 =Attack-2 for
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the attacker. Since Attack-2 is a more aggressive and effective attack strategy than Attack-1,
Attack-2 takes more attacking efforts or cost to deploy. (i.e., ca1 < ca2).
• Cost of defense strategy d1 =Defend-1 is less than the cost of strategy d2 =Defend-2 for the
defender. Again, this is because Defend-2 is a more aggressive and effective defense strategy
than Defend-1. (i.e., cd1 < cd2).
• Generally speaking, a more aggressive/effective attack will cause more damage to a target if
the attack succeeds. Thus based on the definition of ωn in previous subsection, it is safe to
assume that (ω2 ≥ ω1).
Table 6.1: Strategic form of Attack-Defense security game.
Defender (D)
d0 d1 d2
A
tta
ck
er
(A
) a0
0 , 0 cd1 , −cd1 cd2 , −cd2
a1
ω1 − ca1 ,
ca1 − ω1
cd1 − ca1 ,
ca1 − cd1
cd2 − ca1 ,
ca1 − cd2
a2
ω2 − ca2 ,
ca2 − ω2
ω2 + cd1 −
ca2 , ca2 −
cd1 − ω2
cd2 − ca2 ,
ca2 − cd2
In addition, the game model requires us to define what is the outcome when the attacker
deploys one specific attack strategy and the defender implements one specific defense strategy. We
make the following assumptions on the game outcomes:
• Attack is successful under these scenarios: Attack-1 vs. No-Defend; Attack-2 vs. Defend-1
or No-Defend.
• Defense is successful under these scenarios: Defend-1 vs. Attack-1 or No-Attack; Defend-2
vs. Attack-2 or Attack-1 or No-Attack.
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• Zero gain or loss when there is no attack and no defense deployed, i.e., No-Attack vs. No-
Defend.
The above assumptions mean that the more aggressive defense strategy, Defend-2, is secure
against all attacks. However, the low-level defense strategy, Defend-1, is good to defend the low-
level attack, Attack-1, but is still vulnerable to deal with the aggressive attack, Attack-2. Table 6.1
illustrates the payoff matrix of the game in a strategic form.
6.2.3 Nash Equilibria Analysis for Non-cooperation Game
For the proposed security game, there is no Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) where
each player in the game always has the incentive to deviate to another strategy in order to gain
higher payoff. We can argue that there is no pair of deterministic strategy that works for both
players. Therefore, we derive Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) for our model. Figure
6.1 illustrates the extensive form of the game.
Figure 6.1: Extensive form of the Attack-Defense game.
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6.2.3.1 MSNE for Security Game with Three-level Strategies
Definition 1: The Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium [77] of the security game is a proba-
bility distribution Pˆ over the set of pure strategies S for any player such that:
Pˆ = (p1, p2, p3, ..., pr) ∈ RR ≥ 0, and
R∑
t=1
pt = 1 (6.1)
For the attacker, let pa0 be the probability of playing strategy a0, pa1 be the probability of
playing strategy a1, and pa2 = 1 − pa0 − pa1 be the probability for playing strategy a2 for the
attacker. In the same manner, for the defender let pd0 be the probability of playing strategy d0, pd1
be the probability of playing strategy d1, and pd2 = 1 − pd1 − pd2 be the probability for playing
strategy d2.
According to the MSNE definition, the opponents become indifferent about the choice
of their strategies by making the expected payoffs equal. Therefore, in our proposed game, the
mixed strategy makes each player indifferent among all three of their strategies when the expected
utilities from playing strategies a0, a1, and a2 are equal for the attacker, and the expected utilities
from playing strategies d0, d1, and d2 are equal for the defender, i.e.,
EU(pa0) = EU(pa1) = EU(pa2) (6.2)
EU(pd0) = EU(pd1) = EU(pd2) (6.3)
Then, from Table 6.1, we find the expected utility of the attacker for playing strategy a0,
a1, and a2 as function of the mixed strategy which are given by:
EU(pa0) = (pd0)(0) + pd1(−cd1) + pd2(−cd2) (6.4)
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EU(pa1) = (pd0)(ω1 − ca1) + pd1(cd1 − ca1) + psd2(−cd2) (6.5)
EU(pa2) = (pd0)(ω2 − ca2) + pd1(ω2 + cd2 − ca2) + pd2(cd2 − ca2) (6.6)
Substituting (6.4), (6.5), and (6.6) in (6.2), we have the probability distribution pa0 , pa1 ,
and pa2 for the attacker such as:
pa0 =
ca1
ω1
, pa1 =
ca2
ω2
− ca1
ω1
, pa2 = 1−
ca2
ω2
(6.7)
Similarly, the expected utility of the defender for playing strategy d0, d1, and d2 are a
function of the mixed strategy which are given by:
EU(pd0) = (pd0)(0) + pa1(ca1 − ω1) + pa2(ca2 − ω2) (6.8)
EU(pd1) = (pa0)(cd1) + pa1(ca1 − cd1) + pa2(ca2 − ω2 − cd1) (6.9)
EU(pd2) = (pa0)(−cd2) + pa1(ca1 − cd2) + pa2(ca2 − cd2) (6.10)
Substituting (6.8), (6.9), and (6.10) in (6.3), we have the probability distribution pd0 , pd1 ,
and pd2 for the defender such as:
pd0 = 1− (
cd2 − cd1
ω2
+
cd1
ω1
), pd1 =
cd1
ω1
, pd2 =
cd2 − cd1
ω2
(6.11)
The mixed strategy NE for the non-cooperation security game is given by the distribution
{pa0 , pa1 , pa2}, and {pd0 , pd1 , pd2} of equations (6.7) and (6.11) which means that each player will
randomize his selection conformity with the probability distribution. Consequently, the opponents
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in the game will be indifferent about the outcomes of the play.
6.2.3.2 MSNE for Security Game with Two-level Strategies
In case ca2 << ω2, we could have pa1 < 0 according to Equation 6.7, which means that the
attacker would need to be putting a negative weight on a1 strategy to make other player indifferent
between his three strategies, and that is impossible. On the other hand, this negative probability
implies that the attacker has no incentive to deploy the a1 strategy at all, and has strong incentive to
always play a2 strategy (level 2 of attack) instead of a1 strategy (level 1 of attack) when he attempts
to attack the system in order to maximize his payoff. In contrast, the defender does not have any
incentive to play d1 strategy (level 1 of defense) which will minimize his payoff and cost him more
due to the increasing of ω2. Thus, the two strategies a1 and d1 could be eliminated completely from
the strategy space. As a result, the game will reduce to 2-strategy for each player with new MSNE.
In case the system is under aggressive attack with very small cost of attacking, the non-
coordination zero-sum security game will be reformulated with the new strategy space S = {ar, dr|r ∈
{0, 2}}. The attacker has two pure strategies: a0 = No-Attack, and a2 = Attack-2. Also, the de-
fender has two pure strategies: d0 = No-Defend, and d2 = Defend-2. Table 6.2 illustrates the
payoff matrix of the game with two strategies form.
Table 6.2: Strategic form of the Attack-Defense game with two strategies.
Defender (D)
d0 d2
A
tta
ck
er
(A
)
a0
0 , 0 cd2 , −cd2
a2
ω2 − ca2 ,
ca2 − ω2
cd2 − ca2 ,
ca2 − cd2
The distribution {pa0 , pa2 = 1 − pa0} for the attacker, and {pd0 , pd2 = 1 − pd0 } for the
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defender are mixed strategy NE for the non-cooperation security game. In this case, each player
will randomize his selection of two strategies conformity with the probability distribution and he
will be indifferent about the outcomes of the play as well.
In order to compute these probabilities for the attacker, we calculate the expected utility as
function of the mixed strategy which are given by:
EU(pd0) = (pa0)(0) + pa2(ca2 − ω2) (6.12)
EU(pd2) = (pa0)(−cd2) + pa2(ca2 − ω2) (6.13)
The expected utility of the defender for playing strategy d0, and d2 are a function of the
mixed strategy which are given by:
EU(pa0) = (pd0)(0) + pd2(cd2) (6.14)
EU(pa2) = (pd0)(ω2 − ca2) + pd2(cd2 − ca2) (6.15)
As we mentioned above, the expected utilities of playing the two strategies of each player
are equal and no player has incentive to change his strategy. Thus,
EU(pd0) = EU(pd2) (6.16)
EU(pa0) = EU(pa2) (6.17)
Then, substituting (6.12), and (6.13) in (6.16), and (6.14), and (6.15) in (6.17) and solving
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the expression in order to find the probabilities that correspond to the equilibrium, we get:
pa0 =
ω2 − cd2
ω2
, pa2 = 1−
ω2 − cd2
ω2
(6.18)
pd0 =
cd2
ω2
, pd2 = 1−
cd2
ω2
(6.19)
6.3 Case Study of the Attack-Defense Security Game
In this section, we study several types of network attacks and discuss what strategies at-
tackers or defenders can take with minimum resource consumption. Basically, we provide how
our proposed game approach can model specific network security problems. According to our
attack-defense game model, the attacker can take three different attacking actions. In addition, the
defender against the attacker will have three levels of defense strategies as well. In the following
subsections, we introduce three concrete attack defense scenarios to illustrate how attack-defense
strategies and their dynamic interactions can be modeled via our game theoretic framework.
6.3.1 Defense System Against Hello Flood Attack
Hello flood attack [86] is one of the common attacks in the network layer that a wireless
sensor network (WSN) could face, where the attacker will be able to create an illusion of being
a neighbor to other nodes or a base station. The hello flood attack can be implemented by an
attacking node by sending or replying the hello packets , which are used for neighbor discovery,
with significantly high transmission power. This action will convince the nodes in the network that
the adversary node is their neighbor.
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Attack Strategies
In our security game, the hello flood attacker will play the game by employing one of the
two levels of attack in case he decides to attack the system as we mentioned above (i.e., Level one
or two). In the low intensity level-one attack, the adversary node sends hello message to sensor
nodes and convince them that the adversary is one of their neighbors. Thus, the attacker will
behave as a false neighbor node [87].
On the other hand, in the high intensity level-two attack, the adversary node rebroadcasts
the received Route Request Packet (RREQ) with high power to a large number of nodes and con-
vinces the nodes that the attacker node is their base station. More specifically, the communication
of the sensor nodes with the base station usually occurs through their neighbors. Thus, when the
attacker succeeds in creating a false node as base station, and broadcasts a message to all nodes
with a high power transmission, the regular node will be confused, convinced that the message
came from its neighbor, and assume that this is shortest path from the base station. The adversary
in this case can control the entire network through being a false base station [88] [89].
Defense Strategies
In contrast, the defender has one of the two levels of defense against this type of attack.
The level-one defense, which is suitable for dealing with the level-one attack, does not require
high computational power or battery power to implement. This low level of defense is based on
response timing, which is correlated with the transmission distance. There is a predefined time
threshold and a normal node should reply a hello message within that time interval. In case the
reply message sent by a node is not received in that time by the hello message requesting node then
the responding node will be treated as a malicious node [87] [88].
The second level defense strategy is a more advanced detection technique against the ag-
gressive hello flood attack and requires more computational power and battery power than the
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level-one defense strategy. The level-two defense strategy could be Signal Strength plus hello
message based client puzzles scheme (MBCP) [89]. In this scheme, the nodes are classified as
friends according to the signal strength, where each node checks the signal strength of the received
hello message with respect to a known reference signal strength. Therefore, if the received signal
strength of hello message is the same as the predefined fixed signal strength in the radio range, then
the requesting node is a legal node. Otherwise, the node will be classified as a stranger and needs
to be further validated. In order to check the validity of a suspicious node, short client puzzles
will be used; and with the increasing number of hello messages sent, the difficulty of solving the
puzzle will rise as well [89]. Another technique could be applied as a level-two defense for WSN is
location verification scheme, which verifies the locations of abnormal nodes by filtering the nodes
into normal node or malicious node. The detection of the attack utilizes the greedy filtering by
matrix location verification scheme [90]. In summary, the game theoretic strategies of this attack
and defense game are as follows:
• Attacker a1 : Behave as a false neighbor
• Attacker a2 : Behave as a false base station
• Defender d1 : Response timing scheme
• Defender d2 : Signal strength and hello message based client puzzles scheme (MBCP); or
location verification scheme
6.3.2 Defense System Against Malware Attack
Malware is one of the major threats faced by our cyberworld. It is powerful enough to cause
a substantial damage. Throughout the cyber warfare between malware attackers and defenders,
malware has evolved with more advanced propagation, compromising, and stealthy techniques, and
has be widely used by various attackers to disrupt business operation, steal sensitive information,
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gain unauthorized access or any other targeted behavior [91]. In practice, because of the resources
limitation in sensor nodes, that restrict their ability to protect their self and own systems, it is easier
for the nodes to be compromised by the malware attacks [92].
Attack Strategies
The attacker in the proposed game model can alternate between two different intensities of
malware attacks according to his effort and cost of the attacks. The first level attack (i.e., level-
one attack) is to generate malware by reusing existing malicious code. Such a malware is easy to
produce without requiring significant skill from the attacker, but at the same time it is easy to be
detected by signature-based security systems as well.
The second level malware attack (i.e., level-two attack) is more destructive and harder
to defend, where the malware is generated by using zero-day vulnerability, or advanced attacking
techniques such as polymorphism or metamorphism. Polymorphic malware changes its appearance
and creates a countless number of distinct decryptors, and metamorphic malware can automatically
re-code itself each time it spreads out by making the best use of obfuscation techniques [93] [94].
By dynamically changing the code format and signature, these advanced attacking techniques make
it much harder for defenders to detect a malware.
Defense Strategies
The level-one defense against malware attacks, which is suitable to protect a security sys-
tem against the level-one malware attack, utilizes the signature-based security system known as
static analysis. It relies on its own signature dataset to detect and block recognized malware [93].
Existing signature-based security systems, such as various anti-virus software, as long as they
have updated signature database, are fast and effective for fending off level-one malware described
above. However, this type of defense will be insufficient against level-two malware attacks where
the attacker uses new variants of malware to avoid signature based detection.
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Therefore, the level-two defense is the more advanced strategy that has higher require-
ments on computation power, Internet connectivities, detection response time, and security staff
skill/knowledge, etc. This level of defense utilizes dynamic malware analysis techniques, such as
Sandbox, to diagnose malware by utilizing a virtual system to analyze the suspected files. The
operating principle of this virtual system is to monitor the real running status of a suspicious file,
and determine whether or not the file is malicious based on its observed behavior [95] [96] [97].
In summary, the game theoretic strategies of this attack and defense game are as follows:
• Attacker a1: Malware generated using existing malicious code
• Attacker a2: Malware generated by using zero-day vulnerability, polymorphic or metamor-
phic coding techniques
• Defender d1: Static Analysis (i.e.,signature-based security system)
• Defender d2: Dynamic malware analysis techniques (Sandbox)
6.3.3 Defense System Against Password Guessing Attack
Authentication is an essential element of any security model. Most real-world network
systems rely on password for authentication. Authentication of the users in resource constrained
network (i.e., WSNs) is one of the major security concerns. A common threat that is used for the
authentication of the network for verifying users to get the systems resources, is a password guess-
ing attack, which is a brute force attack that attempts to discover a user password by systematically
trying every possible combination of the password [98].
Attack Strategies
The first level attack is a low intensity of password guessing trials that require no skill from
an attacker. The attacker will behave as a normal user and send one login attempt one at a time.
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This type of password guessing attack is slow in password trial, and hence, could take a very long
time for an attacker to discover the correct password.
The second level attack is a high intensity of password guessing trials by utilizing more
advanced techniques, such as using the multiple virtual clients scheme [99]. Using such a scheme,
an attacker could create many virtual clients from one computing device. These virtual clients
behave as completely independent normal users. In this way, an attacker could try many passwords
concurrently and thus dramatically speed up the password guessing process.
Defense Strategies
The low level of defense is login throttling scheme. Basically speaking, this scheme limits
the frequency of failed login attempts. It can simply put an upper limit on the number of failed login
attempts within a given time period, or ask the client to compute the response for a given challenge
in order to ensure that the client is not able to launch a large number of password trials in a small
amount of time. A large number of password guesses in a small time interval will be eliminated
by making password guessing action a time consuming and costly for an adversary [100].
The high level of defense against the level-two password guessing attack described above
is intrusion detection system that has efficient detection mechanism and high speed of detection.
The defender will be able to determine the true source of attacker’s requests by extracting the de-
vice fingerprint. “Device fingerprinting is the process of gathering device information to generate
device-specific signatures and using them to identify individual devices” [101]. These fingerprints
can be extracted from the traffic (transmitted signal) by utilizing an advanced analysis across the
protocol stack in order to identity spoofing [101] [102] [103]. In summary, the game theoretic
strategies of this attack and defense game are as follows:
• Attacker a1: Behave as one normal user and sends one login request at a time.
• Attacker a2: Utilize virtual client techniques in order to send many login requests concur-
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rently at a time.
• Defender d1: Throttling authentication attempts scheme
• Defender d2: An advanced intrusion detection system that can identify login request real
sources (device fingerprint)
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a non-cooperative attack-defense security game formulation
under different attack situations. In this game, the attacker seeks to inflict the most damage on the
network without being detected, while the defender tries to maximize his defending capabilities
with a constraint on the limits of the resources. We have proposed a novel hyper defense sys-
tem which uses the dynamic interaction game model between the attacker and defender to derive
equilibrium strategies.
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CHAPTER 7: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this chapter, we discuss the performance evaluation of our proposed work. We present
the simulation models, experiments, and corresponding results. In order to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the proposed mechanisms, we conducted extensive simulation experiments in C++ and
MATLAB on Windows based platform, and compared with the state-of-the-art. Our intention is to
generate and examine various situations that represent the real-world scenarios as realistically as
possible.
Our simulation study is broadly divided into four parts. Section 7.1 represents the results of
the proposed EE-MAC: An Energy Efficient sensor MAC layer protocol. In section 7.2, we propose
the results of using ADP: An ADaPtive energy efficient approach in any layer of the networking
stack. In section 7.3, we show the results of the proposed routing and clustering mechanisms
under game theory frameworks. The results for the proposed dynamic hyper-defense technique is
discussed in section 7.4.
7.1 EE-MAC Experiment and Results
7.1.1 Simulation Setup
We evaluate EE-MAC: An Energy Efficient sensor MAC layer protocol and compare it with
S-MAC in terms of energy consumption and delay. In the simulations, 700 nodes are scattered over
a square area, where they remain active for a certain duration ta. The sleep times are varied as per
exponential distribution with a mean ts.
We simulate for both fixed and varying ts values. Although the sleep times are exponen-
tially distributed in theory, there is an upper bound dmax on the time a node can sleep after which
it has to wake up irrespective of any triggers in real-life applications. For the combined metric, we
use w1 = w2 = 0.5, i.e., both energy and delay are equally important. As for the energy consump-
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tion in active and sleep states, we assume Wa = 36 and Ws = 0.015 as specified in [9]. Table 7.1
summarizes the simulation parameters.
Table 7.1: Simulation Parameters
Number of Nodes 100− 700
Wa 36
Ws 0.015
w1 0.5; 0.1
w2 0.5; 0.9
7.1.2 Simulation Results
The performance of the proposed protocol is presented in Figures 7.1-7.3. In Figure 7.1,
we show how the energy consumption varies with increasing sleep times for a fixed active time
(ta = 100, 200, and 300). As expected, the more a node sleeps the less would be the energy
consumption. Additionally, with lower active times, energy consumption is also reduced. As
shown in Figure. 7.2, the savings in energy due to increased sleep times is offset by the delay
degradations. We used two different values for the maximum delay allowed for a node to sleep i.e.,
dmax = 300 and dmax = 400. In Figure. 7.3, the combined utility is given for ta = 100, 200, and
300.
In Figures 7.4-7.7, we compare the performance of EE-MAC with S-MAC. Figure. 7.4
illustrates the energy consumption for EE-MAC and S-MAC for 100 to 700 nodes with w1 = w2 =
0.5 (same weights for energy and delay). We can see that EE-MAC performs better in energy
consumption for smaller number of nodes. However, as the number of nodes increase, the energy
savings of EE-MAC also increases accordingly. In Fig. 7.5, we set w1 = 0.9 and w2 = 0.1 to show
the effect of varied importance of delay and energy. The results show that the energy consumption
in EE-MAC with the new weight values is also less than the energy consumption in S-MAC.
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Figure 7.1: Energy consumption vs. sleep times
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Figure 7.2: Delay vs. sleep times
Figure. 7.6 shows the performances of EE-MAC and S-MAC in terms of delay, for a fixed
number of nodes and ts = 100. With high sleep times, EE-MAC performs better as S-MAC is
expected to have an inefficient delay performance. The delay performances improve when the
average sleep time is reduced. Figure. 7.7 presents the delay performances for ts = 20. Further
reduction of ts shows better delay performance for EE-MAC than S-MAC, but with compromised
energy savings.
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Figure 7.3: Combined utility when ta = 100, ta = 200, ta = 300.
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Figure 7.4: Energy consumption for w1 = w2 = 0.5
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Figure 7.5: Energy consumption for w1 = 0.9 and w2 = 0.1
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Figure 7.6: Delay with ts = 100
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Figure 7.7: Delay with ts = 20
Figure. 7.6 and Figure. 7.7 illustrate that the delay performance of EE-MAC is better than
S-MAC for variable sleep times. The results reveal that it is best to have variable sleep times
that can be tuned based on the sensing activity and the desired tradeoff between energy and delay.
The performance difference between the protocols is more significant for delay than the energy
consumption.
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7.2 ADP Experiments and Results
7.2.1 Simulation Setup
In this section, we evaluate our ADP approach by comparing it with the base approach
which applies the same technique but without adaptation, i.e., the sensor nodes in the base approach
have a fixed period of sleeping time. We conduct the experiments that test ADP and the base
approach over three different underlying sensing event densities in order to illustrate the impact of
underlying dynamic sensing event load on the sensor nodes’ behavior. In the first scenario, sensing
event occurrence follows a constant rate of Poisson process all the time. In the second scenario,
the sensing event Poisson arrival rate λ is increased from λlow to λhigh rate in the middle of the
simulation. The last scenario is the reverse of the second scenario, where λ starts from λhigh and
decreases to λlow rate in the middle of the simulation.
We simulate our sensing approach and base approach in Matlab. To be realistic, we use the
parameter values of TelosB Mote, a low-power wireless sensor module, as battery energy model as
specified in [104]. That is to say, the value of power consumption in the wake-up state is 1.8mA,
and power consumption in sleep state is 5.1µA. We set up 10 nodes and classify the nodes into
three groups, i.e., nodes in each group have the same settings and observe/report the same sequence
of sensing events. As explained at Chapter 4, sensors in each group will achieve exactly the same
scheduling by running ADP independently, as if they synchronize with each other. Node 1 to 3
are in Group 1; Node 4 to 6 are in Group 2; and Node 7 to 10 are in Group 3. In order to get an
accurate results, we average the simulation results over 100 runs.
The proposed ADP approach tries to achieve a balanced trade-off between energy saving
and data report latency. As shown in the cost function (4.6), the network operator can adjust the
relative values of the two weight factors w1 and w2 to achieve energy saving while maintaining
an acceptable sensing data report latency. For example, by increasing the value of w2/w1, the
operator can reduce data report latency at the cost of saving less amount of energy. We define the
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latency as the time interval between occurrence of sensing event and node wake up to report the
event. Furthermore, there is no universal amount of delay that can be defined as acceptable latency
because it purely depends on the application and should define by the operator. We assume the
maximum acceptable latency range for our simulation is [4− 6s].
Based on the two performance metrics of remaining battery energy and data report latency,
we evaluate system performance from two perspectives: first, by the end performance, which
illustrates the behavior of sensor nodes at the end of the simulation time; second, by the temporal
performance that shows the behavior of the sensor nodes along their lifetime in three experiments.
In Experiment I, the value of sleeping time for the base approach is ts = 1/λavg. In Experiment II,
we set different values of sleeping time for the base approach, which is ts = 1/λhigh, which will
make the nodes wake up more frequently. In order to show the nodes’ behavior in terms of latency
and energy saving while assuming a lower acceptable amount of latency, in Experiment III, we
keep the value of sleeping time for the base approach as ts = 1/λavg but with a higher value of w2
in order to reduce the latency. The performance of ADP is tested using the following metrics:
• Energy Efficiency: ratio of summation of remaining energy for all nodes divided by the
summation of initial energy of all nodes.
• Average remaining energy for all nodes along the simulation time and remaining energy for
each node at the end of simulation.
• Average latency for all nodes along the simulation time and average latency for each node at
the end of simulation.
• Percentage number of nodes that have less than 20% of energy remaining as compared with
their initial energy.
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7.2.2 Simulation Results
Impact of Sensing Event Density
For the three different sensing event loads as mentioned above, we measure the energy
efficiency and percentage number of nodes that have less than 20% of energy at the end of the
simulation for both our proposed ADP approach and the base approach. In the base approach,
the value of sleeping time is set to be 1/λavg. Figures 7.8 and 7.9 show the performance of ADP
compared with the base approach at the end of time. Figure 7.8 illustrates the percentage ratio
of the number of nodes that have less than 20% of energy level over the three scenarios. This
figure shows that all nodes consume more than 80% of their energy at the end of the simulation
in the base approach, while 44% of the nodes in ADP still has more than 20% of their energy
in the first scenario and 60%, 87% of the nodes still has more than 20% in the second and third
scenarios, receptively. Figure 7.9 illustrates the measurement of energy efficiency for ADP and the
base approach. Compared with the base approach, ADP achieves a higher energy efficiency for all
cases. As the sensing event load changes in the second and third scenarios, ADP still has a higher
energy efficiency than the base approach.
Energy Saving and Latency
This section represents the results of three experiments , as mentioned above, over the sec-
ond scenario of underlying sensing events; in this second scenario the sensing event Poisson arrival
rate λ is increased from λlow to λhigh rate at the middle of the simulation. The results show the per-
formance of ADP and the base approach. The following figures 7.10, 7.11, and 7.12 demonstrate
the behavior of sensor nodes for saving energy and latency over a dynamic changing underlying
sensing event load. Figure 7.10 represents the performance of ADP and the base approach when
the value of fixed sleeping time in the base approach is 1/λavg. The percentage of remaining energy
and the amount of latency for each node at the end of simulation are showed in figure 7.10(a).
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Figure 7.8: Percentage number of nodes that have less than 20% of energy.
Figure 7.9: Energy Efficiency = ratio of the sum of nodes remaining energy to the sum of nodes
initial energy.
To study the impact of factor c, the importance of reporting data, the first group of Node
1 to 3 has the largest value of c, while the third group of Node 7 to 10 has the smallest value of
c. The proposed ADP approach makes nodes consume less energy than the nodes in the base ap-
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proach, and the latency stays low within the acceptable range set. Figure 7.10(b) demonstrates the
measurement of the average of percentage of remaining energy and latency for nodes throughout
the simulation. The graph of average percentage of remaining energy shows the amount of energy
saved in ADP is more than that in the base approach by 40%. When the sensing event density
changes in the middle of simulation, energy consumption rate in the ADP approach also changes
correspondingly. In addition, the average of latency in our approach decreases in the middle of
simulation according to the density change of sensing events.
Figure 7.10: Performance of ADP and the base approach in Experiment I.(when the value of fixed
sleeping time ts for base approach is 1/λavg.) ADP gains a high amount of energy saving and
keeps latency well below the acceptable latency. In (b), change the middle of the curves refer to
the density change of sensing event.
Figure 7.11 illustrates the experiment’s results when the value of ts in the base approach is
1/λhigh. Figure 7.11(a) and 7.11(b) represent the percentage of remaining energy and latency for
each node at the end of the simulation, and the average of remaining energy and latency through-
out the simulation, respectively. In this instance, we notice that our approach also achieves high
performance for saving energy by 45% and keeps latency under the maximum acceptable latency.
To show the nodes’ behavior in term of energy saving and latency with more emphasis on
reducing the latency than on energy saving, we test ADP and the base approach by changing the
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parameters of weighted factors in the experiment III. The results of the average energy remaining
and latency are represented in Figure 7.12, and follow the same trend as the previous experiment
for saving energy. The figure shows that our approach saves 15% energy when compared to the
base approach. It achieves a good improvement in latency, and it could even achieve less latency
when compared with the base approach.
Figure 7.11: Performance of ADP in Experiment II. (The results similar to Fig. 7.10 when the
value of fixed sleeping time ts for base approach is 1/λhigh instead of 1/λavg (waking up more
frequently).) ADP also gains a higher amount of energy saving.
Figure 7.12: Performance of ADP in Experiment II. (The results similar to Fig. 7.11 when the
value of fixed sleeping time ts for base approach is 1/λhigh instead of 1/λavg (waking up more
frequently).) ADP also gains a higher amount of energy saving.
101
7.3 Routing and Clustering Experiments and Results
7.3.1 An Evolutionary Routing Game Algorithm
In order to analyze and study the effects of applying the proposed evolutionary routing
game model for multiple routes in a wireless sensor network, we have conducted simulation exper-
iments. We study the behavior of selecting strategies when sensor nodes do not cooperate with each
other, and how the hop selection strategies converge into evolutionary stable states. The empirical
analysis of our evolutionary routing game consists of three aspects: First, we will demonstrate the
results of our experiments in which sensor nodes have only two available hops to transmit the data
packets, show the impact of implementing Replicator Dynamics, and how the strategies converge
to an evolutionarily stable state. Second, we will present the results of simulation under dynamic
network conditions, and show that the evolutionary game is able to converge to a new ESS. A di-
versity of wireless network conditions will result in different transmitting costs. Node failure due
to changing conditions can occur for various reasons, such as uncontrolled environment, battery
depletion, or a communication failure. Node failure will in turn result in the changes of the cost of
routing paths. Also, the mobility of the nodes in a WSN is another possible cause for the dynamic
changes of the cost of routing paths. Finally, we will provide several experimental results with
multiple hops available (i.e., 3 and 4 heterogeneous hops) as well.
Figures 7.13 and 7.14 represent the scenario of having 2 hops available to forward the
data packet. Figure 7.13(a) shows the behavior of selecting one of two available hops with some
probability where a transmission through hop 1 produces a lower cost than a transmission through
hop 2. The probabilities of selecting the hops are modified depending on average fitness, which is
gained from strategic interaction in subsequent time slots as shown in Figure 7.14(a). Moreover,
in our simulation, any positive value for the utility function would be commutable and feasible.
In Figures 7.13 and 7.14, the cost function of selecting the hops are assumed to be (u1A = 0.5
& u2A = 0.25) and (u1B = 0.166 & u2B = 0.125) for hops 1 and 2, respectively. MSNE is
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p` = {0.57, 0.43} and q` = {0.66, 0.33} for population A and B, respectively.
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Figure 7.13: Proportion of selecting strategies for both population (i.e.,A & B) when number of
available hops for forwarding is R = 2. (a) Hop selecting probability when the initial probabilities
are unequal. (b) Hop selecting probability when the initial probabilities under changing conditions,
(i.e., cost of forwarding through hop 1 higher than hop 2 at t=350, when initial probabilities are
unequal, and (c) when initial probabilities are equal.
First, let us consider the scenario where some sensor nodes become greedier and transmit
the packet with a lower cost through hop 1. Thus, the payoff for those nodes who adopt strategy
s1 at time = 1 is less than the payoff for selecting hop 2, as demonstrated in Figures 7.13(a) and
7.14(a). This is because forwarding through the lower cost hop by more nodes results in collisions
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and thus gains a zero payoff. As a result, the hop selecting probability of greedy nodes decreases
in time = 2 (as shown in Figure 7.13(a) and their payoff increases at that time, which is still
less than the average payoffs of the entire population as shown in Figure 7.14(a)). In a similar yet
opposite scenario, the nodes that are less greedy and transmit through hop 2, which costs more for
transmitting, receive a higher payoff at time = 1 than the nodes transmitting through hop 1.
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Figure 7.14: Related Average fitness of selecting strategies in Fig. 7.13 for both population (i.e.,A
& B) when number of available hops for forwarding is R = 2. (a) Average and weighted sum of
fitness when the initial probabilities are unequal. (b) Related average fitness under changing con-
ditions (i.e., cost of forwarding through hop 1 higher than hop 2 at t=35) when initial probabilities
are unequal, and (c) when initial probabilities are equal.
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Figure 7.15: Proportion of selecting strategies and related average fitness for both population
(i.e.,A & B) when number of available hops for forwarding is R = 3. (a) and (b) Hop selecting
probability when under changing conditions and initial probabilities are unequal for population A
and B , respectively. (b) and (d) Related average.
Moreover, this causes the hop selecting probability to increase in the following time for the
less greedy nodes and decreases their payoffs. In a similar manner, the hop selecting probability is
modified until the system becomes stable and reaches the ESS, (i.e., time=10 in the case of figure
7.13(a)). The amount of time taken to converge to ESS is important in determining energy wastage
in sensor networks due to the collision and loss of data. Figures 7.13(b) and 7.14(b) demonstrate
the case of changing network conditions, where the cost of transmitting through hop 2 becomes less
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than through hop 1, and hop 2 becomes more preferable to be selected from the nodes at t = 35.
The hop selecting probability still converges to a new ESS. Similar observations of convergence to
ESS can be found in the case where initial hop selection probabilities are equal and the network
conditions are changed as shown in Figures 7.13(c) and 7.14(c).
The previous experiment (i.e., figures 7.13 and 7.14) demonstrated that the fairness of prob-
ability distribution of selecting the two hops are achieved only when the probability of selecting
the two hops equals p1 = 0.57, p2 = 0.43, q1 = 0.66, and q2 = 0.33 as in figure 7.13(a), for both
population, respectively, which is the game’s MSNE as well as the ESS. Next, in order to present
the robustness of our game, we conduct the experiment under changing network condition and with
equal and unequal initial probabilities for the player as well. The results show that the strategies
are still able to converge to ESS as shown in figures 7.13(b),7.14(b),7.13(c) and 7.14(c).
Figures 7.15 and 7.16 exhibit the performance of the system and the convergence of hop
selection probabilities to ESS in case of multi-hops (i.e., 3 hops), where each hop has a different
transmitting cost for each population (A and B). Moreover, Figures 7.15 and 7.16 show the be-
havior of nodes when the network conditions changed (i.e., changed at the time t = 45) in our
proposed evolutionary game, and when the initial probabilities are unequal and equal, receptively.
Figures 7.15(a), 7.15(c), 7.16(a), and 7.16(c) show the convergence probabilities of selecting 3
hops to ESS and related average fitness by population A. Figures 7.15(b), 7.15(d), 7.16(b), and
7.16(d) show the convergence probabilities of selecting 3 hops to ESS and related average fitness
by population B. For example, at the beginning in figure 7.15(a), the game converges to ESS for
population A when hop 2 is more preferable to be selected from the nodes and the initial values
for utility of selecting s1, s2, and s3 are 0.2, 0.9 and 0.5, respectively. At time = 45, the network
conditions are changed: Hop 1 becomes more attractive for the sensors and adopting s1 will pro-
duce higher payoff than selecting s2 or s3. The initial values for utility of selecting s1, s2, and s3
are changed to 0.5, 0.3 and 0.2, respectively. Similarly in Figure 7.15(b), the network conditions
are changed with different utility values for each strategy selection. The system reaches stability
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under new network conditions and converges to a different ESS for all populations.
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Figure 7.16: Proportion of selecting strategies and related Average fitness for both population
(i.e.,A & B) when number of available hops for forwarding is R = 3. (a) and (b) Hop selecting
probability when the initial probabilities under changing conditions and initial probabilities are
equal for population A and B , respectively. (b) and (d) Related average.
Figure 7.17 shows the convergence of hop selection probabilities to ESS in case of having
4 hops available, and their utilities are varied according to transmitting cost. Figures 7.17(a) and
7.17(b) illustrate the converges to the ESS for populationA and B, respectively. We notice that the
rate of convergence to ESS is affected by the number of hops, variety of the transmitting cost, and
the initial access probabilities of players, where the convergence rate to ESS decreases when the
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number of hops increases. Figures 7.17(c) and 7.17(d) illustrate the converges to the ESS under
new network conditions for population A and B, respectively. As a result, the system will be
able to reach stability with 2-hop and multi-hops of different transmitting costs, even under the
changing of network conditions and with varied values of initial access probabilities.
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Figure 7.17: Proportion of selecting strategies for both population (i.e.,A & B) when number of
available hops for forwarding is R = 4. (a) and (b) Hop selecting probability for populationA and
B , respectively. (b) and (d) under changing condition of network (i.e., t = 45).
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7.3.2 Energy Efficient Clustering Algorithm
In order to test the veracity of the CE in determining the clusterhead set in the proposed
COPA for WSN, we resort to simulation experiments. We simulate a system of N sensor nodes
using MATLAB. In order to measure the performance of our clustering algorithm, we compare it
with two other well-known clustering techniques: probability-based [105] and CROSS [13]. The
probability of being a clusterhead is fixed in the probability-based, and is set to 0.05 as in [105].
The probability of being a clusterhead in CROSS is defined as p = 1 − ω 1N−1 , 0 < ω < 1;
where the value of ω is set as per [13]. For CoPA, the probability of being a clusterhead or a
cluster member depends on the CE probability distribution for the clustering game as presented in
Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.3). We assume that the base station is located outside the sensing field. The
sensor nodes form a connected network i.e., we get a single component graph.
The rest of the simulation parameters are presented in Table 7.2. Furthermore, we identify
three metrics that reveal the performance of any clustering technique: network lifetime, average
residual energy, and amount of data sent to the base station (throughput).
Table 7.2: Simulation Parameters
Parameters Value
Initial energy 0.5 J
Transmit and receive energy 50 nJ
Transmit to the base station 100 nJ
Data aggregation energy 5 nJ
In order to show the relative performance of exclusion policy of CoPA, Figure 7.18 presents
the number of nodes that contribute to the game for a various number of sensor nodes (i.e., N =
20, ..., 140). Because of the exclusion policy (Section 5.4.4), we notice that the average number of
participated nodes is less than the total number of sensor nodes (i.e., 55%− 65%). Therefore, the
strategy space will significantly reduce and the equilibrium convergence will speed up.
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Figure 7.18: Number of nodes that participate in our proposed clustering game (CoPA).
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Figure 7.19: Average residual energy.
Figure 7.19 shows the average residual energy of the sensor nodes for the three clustering
methods. The number of nodes considered in this experiment was 50. For the probability-based
and CROSS clustering, the average residual energy for the nodes drops to almost 0 in 100 and
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150 rounds, respectively. CoPA on the other hand has a steadier energy degradation. Figure 7.20
exhibits the network lifetime for various number of sensor nodes (i.e., N = {40, ...140}) for the
probability-based, CROSS, and CoPA. We define network lifetime as ‘the lifespan of the first node
in all sensor nodes that depletes its energy’ [13]. We consider a node’s energy is exhausted when
99% of the sensor’s initial energy has been consumed. CoPA achieves a longer lifetime than the
other two for any numbers of nodes.
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Figure 7.20: Network Lifetime.
We also measure the throughput of the system according to the amount of data sent to
the base station, where the only way to reach the base station is through the clusterheads. In the
absence of any clusterhead, the data cannot be relayed to the base station. In Figure 7.21, we
present the amount of data that was sent to the base station. The simulation results show that
CoPA has the highest value, which is 5% and 20% more than the probability-based and CROSS,
respectively. Consequently, CoPA ensures of determination of clusterheads in each round and
guarantees a pathway for the sensed data to be sent to the base station. As a final comment, the
absence of clusterhead could occur continuously in the probability-based and CROSS because of
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their dependence on the node’s probability for playing as a clusterhead, whereas CoPA guarantees
of the existence of clusterheads in every round till the network dies.
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Figure 7.21: Amount of data sent to Base Station.
7.4 Attack and Defense Experiments and Results
7.4.1 Simulation Setup
In this section, we have simulated our proposed defense approach (i.e., hyper defense)
for wireless sensor network scenario and compared it with two “always-on” constant defending
systems in order to validate the performance of our model. The first constant defending system
employs the low intensity (level-one) defense all the time, and the second constant defending
system employs the high intensity (level-two) defense all the time as well. We assume that all the
nodes in the network have the same initial battery energy in the beginning of the game. We also take
into account a network where the nodes consider the battery life as the priority requirement, and
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where the nodes defend against resource consumption attacks. The attacker aims at attacking the
network and destroying/reducing the lifetime of the network. In such circumstances, the security
value ω may be represented by the conserved energy by success defense action. The attacker and
defender will play the game according to the equations in Chapter 6 (section 6.2.3).
The proposed attack-defense model (i.e., hyper defense) tries to achieve a suitable defense
strategy for the system as well as to consider the limitation of the resources. We evaluate system
performance by identifying two metrics: average residual energy, and defense success rate. Fur-
thermore, we consider the variety of security value ωn compared to the cost of attack can and cost
of defense cdn in order to show the impact of this variable ωn on the performance of the model in
two experiments.
7.4.2 simulation Results
In the first experiment, we assume that the security value ωn is higher than the attacking
and defending cost (i.e., ωn > can and ωn > cdn) while considering the variety of the attack and
defense cost as illustrated in Figures 7.22, 7.23, and 7.24. In Figure 7.22, the cost of attack and
defense are assumed to be equal (i.e., can = cdn). In Figure 7.23, the attacking cost is assumed to
be less than the defending cost (i.e., can < cdn). Inversely, the cost of attack is assumed to be higher
than the cost of defense (i.e., can > cdn) in Figure 7.24. The proposed hyper defense achieves a
higher percentage of average residual energy than the constant level-2 defense. In the proposed
hyper defense, the defender still has 55%, 40%, and 58% of the energy in the three scenarios (i.e.,
Figures 7.22(a), 7.23(a), and 7.24(a)) of different defending/attacking cost, respectively. However,
the defender has 29%, 18%, and 28% of the energy in the constant the constant level-2 defense as
shown in Figures 7.22(a), 7.23(a), and 7.24(a), respectively.
In addition, the constant level-1 defense consumes less amount of energy, but we notice
that the defense success rate is too low compared with our proposed model. The hyper defense
produces a good defense success rate (i.e., 0.7, 0.7, and 0.8) as illustrated in Figures 7.22(b),
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7.23(b), and 7.24(b), respectively, compared with the constant level-1 defense as well as achieving
a higher residual energy compared with the constant level-2 defense approach.
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Figure 7.22: Average residual energy and defense success rate when ω is higher than can and cdn
(i.e, ωn > can, cdn, n ∈ {1, 2}), and the cost of attack and defense are equal (i.e., can = cdn),
respectively.
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Figure 7.23: Average residual energy and defense success rate when ω is higher than can and cdn
(i.e, ωn > can, cdn, n ∈ {1, 2}, and can < cdn)
In the second experiment, we consider the diversity of security value compared with at-
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tacking and defending cost. We assume that security value ωn is significantly higher than can and
cdn, and assume that can = cdn. This means that if the attacker succeeds, the system will be at a
very high risk and suffer a big loss. Figure 7.25 presents the average residual energy and defense
success rate when the security value ωn is significantly higher than the cost of attack can and cost
of defense cdn. It is interesting to observe that hyper defense still has a higher average residual
energy than the constant level-2 defense approach as shown in Figure 7.25(a).
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Figure 7.24: Average residual energy and defense success rate when ω is higher than can and cdn
(i.e, ωn > can, cdn, n ∈ {1, 2}, and can > cdn).
Moreover, from Figure 7.25(b), we see that the proposed hyper defense achieves a higher
defense success rate than the constant level-1 defense. Because of the high security value, the
defender’s chances of activating/utilizing the Defend-2 strategy also increase, and the chance of
utilizing each strategy will be dynamically adjusted according to the variable cost in our proposed
model. This implies that the equilibrium of the proposed security game is fairly robust on the
performance of the hyper defense system. As a final comment, the proposed hyper defense system
saves energy and achieves a high rate of success concurrently instead of turning on the defense
system 100% of the time, especially for a network that emphasizes on energy efficiency.
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Figure 7.25: Average residual energy and defense success rate when ω is significantly higher than
can and cdn (i.e, ωn >> can, cdn, n ∈ {1, 2}).
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, we evaluated our proposed mechanisms through extensive simulation exper-
iments and compared these mechanism with the state-of-the-art. Through the results of EE-MAC,
we observe reduced energy consumption at the cost of increased delay. EE-MAC also improves
the delay performance for fixed number of nodes compared to S-MAC. In the simulation using
varying traffic loads, ADP improved energy efficiency while keeping latency low. In addition, our
experimental results under dynamic network conditions showed that the proposed evolutionary
routing game model is converging to strategy choices to ESS successfully. CoPA achieves supe-
rior performance in terms of network lifetime and throughput compared to other popular clustering
techniques as shown in the results. The proposed hyper-defense system achieves high performance
in terms of residual energy and defense success rate compared to two other constant defending sys-
tems as well.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
8.1 Conclusions
As sensor nodes have limited power resources, achieving energy efficiency and security
in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) design is of utmost fundamental issues. This dissertation
explores various techniques that would satisfy the variety of requirements of real-world WSN ap-
plications, and sheds light on five proposed approaches to investigate the energy efficiency and
security issues in WSN design. Chapter 3 dealt with a MAC layer, while Chapter 4 offered a dy-
namic feedback approach to energy efficiency of any layers of the protocol stack in WSNs. Chap-
ter 5 presented two models of energy efficiency in routing and clustering under a game theoretic
framework. A dynamic hyper approach for a defense mechanism against several types of WSNs
attacks is proposed. Specifically, the major contributions of this dissertation are summarized as
follows:
• Since sensor nodes consume more power while sensing and transmitting compared to idle
time, achieving a low duty-cycle improves performance in terms of energy consumption.
Chapter 3 presents our novel approach of putting nodes to sleep at the cost of degraded delay
performance. To that end, we propose an Energy Efficient MAC layer protocol, called EE-
MAC, and derive the energy consumption, and the incurred delay when the node switches
between active state and sleep state. We also propose a combined metric, which is a linear
sum of the energy consumption and the incurred delay to find the optimal sleep time.
• In Chapter 4, we propose a novel adaptive energy saving approach called ADP for WSNs.
The goal of ADP is to extend the network lifetime without introducing much data sensing
report latency. To achieve this goal, we dynamically adjust the optimal sleep time and adapt
the behavior of the sensor nodes depending on a fluctuating underlying sensing event load,
remaining battery levels, and the importance of sensing data.
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• In Chapter 5, we propose two new mechanisms for routing and clustering in WSNs under
game theoretic frameworks. Our first approach is to design an evolutionary routing game
to reduce the load and avoid collision on the most used routes in a distributed manner. We
derive the equilibrium strategies of selecting the next hop in the routing game, and have
proved that the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium derived in the game is an Evolutionary
Stable Strategy (ESS). Moreover, we present the replicator dynamic model to show how the
populations improve their performance and converge their strategy selections to ESS over
time based on payoff comparison as demonstrated by the experiment results. The second
theoretic approach is based on the concept of Correlated Equilibrium (CE), called A Cost
and Payment-based clustering Algorithm (CoPA). The proposed Correlated Equilibrium en-
sures the efficiency and fairness in the long term. Linear optimization and machine learning
techniques are utilized for the solutions. We have also proposed a simple way to determine a
node’s eligibility to participate in the clustering game based on a flexible weighted function.
The unsuitable nodes are prohibited, thereby reducing the strategy space and speeding up
convergence to the equilibrium.
• Chapter 6 presents our novel non-cooperative attack-defense security game formulation un-
der different attack situations. In this game, the attacker seeks to inflict the most damage
in the network without being detected, while the defender tries to maximize his defend-
ing capabilities with a constraint on the limits of the resources. We have proposed a novel
hyper-defense system that uses the dynamic interaction game model between the attacker
and defender to derive equilibrium strategies.
We have extensively evaluated the energy efficiency of the proposed mechanisms and compared
them with the state-of-the-art mechanisms in the specific target domain. Our finding shows that
EE-MAC has improved performance as compared to S-MAC; ADP achieves a significant gain in
energy saving, a high energy efficiency, and has a desirable effect on latency. Furthermore, the
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replicator design model for WSNs routing shows that the sensor nodes in a WSN improve their
performance in the long term, and the proposed CoPA achieves a superior performance over that
of probability-based and CROSS clustering based approaches. Finally, we have shown the good
performance of the proposed hyper defense model when compared with two different constant
defense systems as demonstrated in the experiment results.
8.2 Future Work
Although this dissertation has made significant progress on energy efficient and security
on WSNs design, there are many open research issues. A number of mechanisms proposed in this
dissertation can be extended, and applied in a variety of ways. In this section, we shed a light on
some of the interesting topics that are worth pursuing in the future.
One of these mechanisms can be applied as follows. In a WSN, sensors have two major
operations: sensing and forwarding data [38]. In part of our dissertation, we focused on pro-
ducing an energy-efficient way to sense an event based on the feedback. Other studies, such
as PW-MAC [39], focus on the forwarding and transmission of sensed data. PW-MAC is an
energy-efficient predictive wakeup MAC protocol that enables senders to accurately predict re-
ceivers wakeup times. The protocol minimizes idle listing and overhearing by enabling a sender to
rendezvous with a receiver quickly according to the predicted receiver wake-up time. It could be
beneficial to combine a PW-MAC technique and our proposed ADP approach to create a complete
energy efficient scheduling system.
Another promising direction is the deeper study of the application of employing game
theory in wireless communication. For example, our proposed evolutionary routing game can be
extended. Although our proposed MSNE is fair and optimal, collisions may still occur. Thus, one
of the coordination equilibrium in game theory may apply a solution for the routing game in order
to completely avoid collision issues in routing protocol. In addition, the study of security issues in
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WSNs, and awareness of the application’s requirements with all the related factors, are significant
directions worthy of future investigation. Therefore, the application of game theory in WSNs will
continue to mature and will open new possibilities for designing robust routing algorithms and
security systems.
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